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COMMENTS 
Educational Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws, and 
the Supreme Colll't 
Recently, state systems of financing public education have been 
overturned or seriously threatened by several state and federal court 
cases1 based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District,2 which 
invalidated the Texas system of educational financing, will be argued 
before the Supreme Court next term. This Comment will examine 
the doctrinal3 and policy problems that the Court will confront and 
the alternative solutions that are available to the Court when it con-
1. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 
1971), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. June 7, 1972): Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 
334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C-253652 (Super. Ct, 
Maricopa County, Ariz., Jan. 13, 1972); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 
96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971): Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); 
Sweetwater County Planning Comm. for the Organization of School Dists. v. Hinkle, 
491 P .2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971). 
2. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. 
June 7, 1972). 
3. Over the decade, a substantial quantity of legal commentary has been addressed 
to the issue of the constitutionality of educational financing systems. This literature 
includes J. COONS, w. CLUNE&: s. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND Punuc EDUCATION 
(1970) [hereinafter PRlvATE WEALTH AND Punuc EDuCAnoN), portions of which were 
published in Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State 
Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305 (1969) [hereinafter Educational Opportunity]; 
A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPOR• 
TUNITY (1968); Coons, Clune&: Sugarman, A First Appraisal of Serrano, 2 YALE REV. L, 
&: Soc. ACT. 111 (1971) [hereinafter First Appraisal]; Dimond, Serrano: A Victory of 
Sorts for Ethics, Not Necessarily for Education, id. at 133 (1971); Goldstein, Interdistrict 
Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its 
Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 504 (1972): Horowitz, Unseparate But Unequal-The 
Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 UCLA L. REV. 
1147 (1966); Horowitz &: Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public 
Education and Public Assistance Programs from Place to Place Within a State, 15 
UCLA L. REv. 787 (1968); Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court's Responsibilities and 
opportunities in the Development of Federal Constitutional Law, 60 CAuF. L, REv. 720 
(1972); Kirp, The Poor, the Schools and Equal Protection, 38 HARV. EDuc. REv. 635 
(1968); Kirp &: Yudof, Serrano in the Political Arena, 2 YALE REv. L. &: Soc, ACT. 143 
(1971) [hereinafter Kirp &: Yudof]; Kurland, Equal Educational opportunity: The 
Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 583 (1968); 
Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969); Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 
71 CoLUM. L. REv. 1355 (1971); Shanks, Educational Financing and Equal Protection: 
Will the California Supreme Court's Breakthrough Become the Law of the Land?, I J. 
LAw &: Enuc. 73 (1972): Silard &: White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Educa• 
tion: The Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 WIS, L. 
REv. 7; Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model Legislative Response, 2 
YALE REv. L. &: Soc. ACT. 123 (1971) [hereinafter School Finance]; Comment, The Evolu-
tion of Equal Protection: Education, Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7 HARV. C1v, 
RIGHTS·Clv. Lm. L. REv. 103 (1972) [hereinafter Comment); Kirp &: Yudof, Book Review, 




siders the constitutionality of the Texas system, which is typical of 
the educational financing programs that have generated so much 
recent litigation. 
Currently, most states finance public education primarily 
through taxes assessed on real property ·within each individual school 
district.4 State governments usually provide some aid to school dis-
tricts in the form of flat, per pupil grants or equalization grants to 
ensure that each district expends a certain minimum amount per 
pupil." Nevertheless, large discrepancies among districts in revenue-
raising capacity continue to exist due to differences in taxable prop-
erty values. A wealthy district may raise more revenue than a poorer 
district while taxing itself at a lower rate.6 Furthermore, many states 
4. K.irp &: Yudof, supra note 3, at 143. 
5. The following brief summary of the most widely used methods of state aid to 
local school districts is based on PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, 
at 63-197, and Educational Opportunity, supra note 3, at 312-17. 
The most elementary system for providing state aid is the flat grant. Under this 
plan each district receives a specified number of dollars per pupil. This method will 
generally neither reduce nor widen the gap in per pupil expenditures between 
richer and poorer districts since the per pupil expenditures in each are increased by 
the same amount. Therefore, full equality will never be achieved simply through fl.at 
grants. If the grants are made on the basis of units other than pupils, such as class-
rooms or teachers, then the gap between districts would be widened since the 
wealthier districts are capable of providing more of such units. 
A second method is known as the foundation plan. Under this system, the local 
district agrees to tax at a certain minimum rate. The state then provides an amount 
of money necessary to bring each district up to a specified minimum level of ex-
penditures per pupil or other unit. Although the foundation plan may decrease the 
gap between districts, it will not eliminate it since the wealthier districts are capable 
of financing expenditures far in excess of the minimum level. 
A number of states have combined the fl.at grant and the foundation plan. Under 
one such method, the state determines the foundation amount by subtracting the 
amount raised by a district through its own effort from a guaranteed minimum 
amount. This foundation grant is then added to a fl.at grant to determine the total 
state aid. Another combination plan is used in Illinois, California, and Minnesota, 
where three of the most important cases challenging educational financing have arisen. 
Under this plan, the amount raised locally at the specified tax rate is first added to 
the fl.at grant. The sum is then subtracted from the guaranteed minimum level per 
pupil. The district then receives the difference plus the fl.at grant. As a result, if a 
district is so poor that the difference between the amount it raises by itself and the 
guaranteed minimum level exceeds the amount of the fl.at grant, then the district will 
in effect receive no fl.at grant at all since the amount of the flat grant has actually 
been subtracted from the guaranteed level along with the amount raised locally. On 
the other hand, if a district is too wealthy to receive any aid under the foundation 
plan, it still receives the fl.at grant. This particular formula produces a wider gap 
between the wealthier and poorer districts than would have existed under a simple 
foundation or the first combination plan. 
A method which at least has the potential for achieving equality among districts 
is the percentage equalizing plan. Under this system, the local district sets its own 
budget. The state grant is based upon the relative wealth (in terms of taxable 
property) of each district in relation to the wealthiest district in the state. Each district 
is required to finance locally the remainder of its budget in order to receive the full 
state grant. In practice, however, the states employing this method have destroyed its 
potential for equalization through modifications. 
6. If district A contained $100,000 worth of taxable property for each student 
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place a maximum ceiling on the rate at which a district may tax 
itself.7 As a result, poorer districts are often prohibited from raising 
as much revenue as wealthier districts even if they are willing to 
suffer a steeper tax rate. Thus the amount of financial resources 
devoted to a child's education is largely dependent upon the taxable 
wealth of the district in which he lives.8 These inequities have often 
been criticized and are currently the subject of constitutional liti-
gation. 
I. HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LmGATION 
INVOLVING EDUCATIONAL FINANCING 
Judicial scrutiny of inequalities in public education began with 
Brown v. Board of Education.9 Initially, the courts focused almost 
exclusively on inequalities created by racial discrimination. How-
ever, in 1968, the Illinois educational financing system was chal-
lenged as being in violation of the equal protection clause in Mclnnis 
v. Shapiro.10 The public schools of Illinois were administered by local 
school districts. As is typically the case, the bulk of revenue for 
operating schools was raised by ad valorem taxes on property within 
each individual district.11 The state supplemented the local revenue 
by providing a flat, per pupil grant and an equalization grant. The 
latter consisted of the difference between the sum of the amount per 
pupil raised within a district plus the flat grant and a 400 dollar 
foundation level prescribed by the state.12 Consequently, 1,000 
dollars was available to each student in the richest school district in 
Illinois as opposed to 480 dollars per pupil in the poorest school 
enrolled in its public schools, while district B contained only $10,000 worth of property 
for each student, district A could tax itself at 1% and still raise $1000 per pupil, while 
district B could only raise $500 per pupil by taxing itself at 5%. 
7. For example, the Florida legislature enacted a "Millage Rollback Act" providing 
that any district that taxed itself at a rate in excess of ten mills ad valorem was 
ineligible for state aid. This legislation was declared unconstitutional by a three-judge 
district court in Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), which the Supreme 
Court vacated and remanded in Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971), with an order 
to abstain while an action challenging the legislation in the state court proceeded. 
8. In California the elementary-school district with the highest per pupil expendi-
ture at the time of the Serrano decision spent $2586 per pupil while the lowest spent 
only $407. Legislative Analyst, Public School Finance, pt. 5, at 7, cited in Serrano v. 
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 594, 487 P.2d 1241, 1247, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 607. More astounding 
still is the reported differential in Texas where the wealthiest district spent $5834 per 
pupil while the poorest spent $264. Stevens, U.S. Court Upsets Texas School Tax Tied 
to Property, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1971, at I, col. I; at 15, col. 4 [hereinafter Stevens]. 
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
IO. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd. mem. sub nom. Mcinnis v. Ogilvie, 894 
U.S. 322 (1969). The complaint challenged ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122 §§ 11-1, 11-6, 11-9, 
18-1 to -4, 18-8 to -14, 29-5, 34-22 to -29, 34-42 to -82. 327 F. Supp. at 829 n.2. 
11. 293 F. Supp. at 330. 
12. 293 F. Supp. at 330. See note 5 supra for a more complete explanation of this 
plan. 
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district.13 A three-judge federal district court held that the Illinois 
financing system did not deny the complaining students equal pro-
tection of the laws.14 Alternatively, the court concluded that there 
were no judicially manageable standards for apportioning educa-
tional resources on the basis of the individual student's educational 
needs.15 
The first constitutional challenge to a state educational financing 
system ended abruptly when the Supreme Court summarily affirmed 
the decision in Mclnnis.16 A year later in Burrus v. Wilkerson17 the 
Court summarily affirmed the judgment of a three-judge decision 
that had relied heavily on Mclnnis to support its holding that the 
Virginia school financing system did not violate equal protection. 
The Court's summary disposition of Mclnnis and Burrus might be 
interpreted as foreclosing constitutional challenges to educational 
financing systems. However, the uncertain status of Mclnnis as prece-
dent is demonstrated by the current wave of educational financing 
litigation that has developed despite Mclnnis. 
In the leading case of Serrano v. Priest,18 the California supreme 
court concluded that Mclnnis did not preclude further constitutional 
scrutiny of the state's educational financing system.19 The court ac-
knowledged that a summary affirmance by the United States Supreme 
Court of the judgment of a three-judge district court is technically an 
adjudication on the merits. But it noted that such an affirmance, like a 
denial of certiorari, may merely indicate an attempt to relieve docket 
pressures.20 The court further observed that the Supreme Court has 
sometimes decided a case on grounds contrary to the implications of 
a summary affirmance of a judgment.21 The California court empha-
sized that the Supreme Court apparently does not consider the 
educational financing issue closed since in Askew v. Hargrave22 the 
Court remanded a challenge to the Florida school financing system 
to the district court ordering abstention pending a state court pro-
13. 293 F. Supp. at 330. 
14. 293 F. Supp. at 332. 
15. 293 F. Supp. at 335. 
16. 394 U.S. 322 (1969). 
17. 397 U.S. 44 {1970), afjg. mem. 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969). 
18. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P .2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). 
19. 5 Cal. 3d at 615-18, 487 P.2d at 1263-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623-25. In distinguishing 
Mcinnis (and at other points in the opinion), the court relied on Educational oppor-
tunity, supra note 3, at 308-09, a condensation of PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EouCA-
TION, supra note 3, at 311-15. 
20. 5 Cal. 3d at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624, citing Frankfurter &: 
Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 HAP.v. L. REv. 
1, 14 {1930). 
21. 5 Cal. 3d at 616 n.35, 487 P .2d at 1264 n.35, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624 n.35. 
22, 401 U.S. 476 (1971). 
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ceeding and then a further hearing on the merits.23 The Supreme 
Court may have summarily affirmed in Mclnnis because the issues 
were not clearly defined.24 The California court also argued that the 
disposition in Mclnnis rested primarily on the nonjusticiability of 
the plaintiffs' prayer for equalized fulfillment of students' educa-
tional needs, and thus a complaint proposing a different standard 
for relief is not foreclosed.25 Finally, the California court reasoned 
that the Supreme Court seldom makes a final disposition of an im-
portant and complex question like educational financing without 
oral arguments or a written opinion.26 For these reasons, the court 
concluded that the constitutionality of educational financing systems 
similar to the one involved in Mclnnis is still an open question.27 
Despite the arguments raised in Serrano, the Supreme Court may 
have intended Mclnnis to be dispositive of the constitutional ques-
tion since the affirmance was a decision on the merits. To allocate 
judicial resources efficiently, the Court must decide matters of im-
portance in summary opinions. Furthermore, 1.W:clnnis has not been 
totally ignored by state and federal courts. The recent New York 
case Spano v. Board of Education,28 which dismissed a challenge to 
that state's educational :financing system, relied on Mclnnis and 
Burrus.29 The New York court observed that briefs were submitted 
to the Supreme Court in Mclnnis by the same counsel involved in 
Serrano and inferred that the Court was fully acquainted with the 
nature of the issues at stake.30 After considering the Serrano attempt 
to distinguish Mclnnis, the court concluded that it should not specu-
late on the binding effect of recent Supreme Court decisions.31 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine what Mclnnis stands for. If 
the Supreme Court intends that Mclnnis be interpreted to foreclose 
constitutional challenges to property tax financing of school systems, 
it will be necessary for the Court to review another educational 
financing case in order to lay the issue to rest. 
Once past the barrier of Mclnnis, litigation challenging educa-
23. 5 Cal. 3d at 617 n.37, 487 P.2d at 1265 n.37, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625 n.37. The 
Supreme Court's remand in Hargrave may not mean that the Court considers the 
constitutionality of school financing by local property ta.xes an open issue. The 
complaint in Hargrave challenged the "Millage Rollback Act," which specified a 
maximum tax rate for school districts, rather than the school financing system as a 
whole. See note 7 supra. 
24. 5 Cal. 3d at 617 n.37, 487 P.2d at 1265 n.37, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625 n.37. 
25. 5 Cal. 3d at 617, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625. The court in Rodrig11ez 
relied primarily upon this ground for distinguishing Mclnnis. 337 F. Supp. 280, 283-84. 
26. 5 Cal. 3d at 617-18, 487 P.2d at 1264-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25. 
27. 5 Cal. 3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625. 
28. - Misc. 2d -, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972). 
29. - Misc. 2d at-, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 231. 
30. - Misc. 2d at-, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 232. 
31. - Misc. 2d at -, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 232-33. 
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tional financing systems proved surprisingly successful. Serrano was 
the watershed decision. The plaintiffs brought a. class action on 
behalf of all the public school children and their parents in Cali-
fornia except those living in the school district that provided the 
greatest educational opportunity.32 They alleged that the California 
school financing system, which relied primarily on local property 
ta.--ces, violated the equal protection clause since it required the par-
ents of children in relatively poor school districts to "pay a higher 
tax rate to obtain the same or lesser educational opportunities than 
those afforded to children in other districts."33 The California system 
of educational financing did not vary significantly from the Illinois 
program challenged in Mclnnis.34 Nevertheless, the California su-
preme court held that the plaintiffs stated a valid cause of action 
under the equal protection clause35 and remanded the case to the 
lower court for trial, reversing the court of appeals' order36 that had 
sustained a demurrer on the basis of Mclnnis. 
Subsequently, in Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,37 a federal district 
court denied a motion to dismiss a complaint that challenged on 
equal protection grounds the educational financing system of Minne-
sota. In Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, a 
three-judge federal district court in Texas became the first court to 
hold that a state system38 of educational financing was unconstitu-
32. 5 Cal. 3d at 589, 487 P .2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604. 
33. 5 Cal. 3d at 589-91, 487 P.2d at 1244-45, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05. The plaintiffs 
sought a declaration that the system was unconstitutional and a court-ordered re-
allocation of funds. The suit was brought against "state and county officials charged 
with administering the financing system," including the state treasurer. 
34. 5 Cal. 3d at 592-95, 487 P.2d at 1246-47, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606-08. See CAL. Eouc. 
CODE §§ 17300, 17651-80, 17702, 17751, 17901-02, 20501-1255 (West Supp. 1972). 
35. 5 Cal. 3d at 618-19, 487 P .2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626. 
On motion to dismiss, the California supreme court assumed that there is a causal 
relationship between educational expenditures and educational quality. 5 Cal. 3d at 
601 n.16, 487 P .2d at 1253 n.16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613 n.16. The plaintiffs must establish 
through the use of e.'{pert testimony at trial that such a relationship 'exists. Available 
data suggest that this might well be difficult. See notes 192-95 infra and accompanying 
text. But see Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 246-57, 287 A.2d 187, 199-205 
(1972). The court concluded on the basis of expert testimony that there is at least some 
correlation beaveen educational expenditures and educational quality. The court 
conceded, however, that there was not a great deal of persuasive data available. See 
notes 191-97 infra and accompanying text. Plaintiffs in Serrano must also provide the 
trial court with a standard for relief if they prevail on the merits. 
Although Serrano is a landmark decision, it will probably never be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court. Rodriguez, which will be argued next term, is the likely vehicle of the 
Court's view. Also, the Supreme Court may lack jurisdiction over an appeal since the 
California court also based its decision on the California constitution. 5 Cal. 3d at 
596 n.11, 487 P .2d at 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.11. This raises the substantial 
possibility that an adequate state ground for the decision exists. See Karst, supra note 
3, at 743-48. 
36. Serrano v. Priest, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Cal. App. 1970). 
37. 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971). 
38. The methods used to finance public education in Texas are not materially 
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tional under the fourteenth amendment. Since then, a state trial court 
in New Jersey relied on both the federal and state constitutions to in-
validate that state's financing scheme.39 In addition, courts in Ari-
zona40 and Wyoming41 have followed the precedent set by Serrano. 
Currently, lawsuits challenging educational financing systems under 
the equal protection clause are pending in courts across the nation.4? 
A constitutional question that apparently had suffered a premature 
death has been revived as a controversial legal issue. 
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE 
A. Standards of Judicial Scrutiny of Legislation Under 
the Fourteenth Amendment 
Most of the pending challenges to state systems of educational 
financing are based on the argument that these systems violate the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme 
Court has employed two different standards for reviewing legislation 
under the equal protection clause.43 In ordinary cases, including 
those involving business regulation statutes, the Court has employed 
a standard of restrained review, sometimes referred to as traditional 
equal protection. When it applies this standard, the Court only in-
quires whether there is a rational relationship between the classifica-
tion established by the statute under scrutiny and a legitimate state 
different from the methods employed in California or Illinois. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. 
arts. 16.71-.78, 20.01 (1969); TEX. CONST. art. 7 §§ 3, 3a. The state provides a 
minimum amount of expenditures per pupil to the local districts through a Minimum 
Foundation Program. Additional state aid is apportioned from the state's Available 
School Fund. The local districts must pay off bonded indebtedness for capital ex-
penditures, fund all expenditures above the minimum level, and provide their share 
of the Minimum Foundation Program through taxes on local property. 337 F. Supp. 
at 281. The district court focused on inequalities in per pupil expenditures as well as 
inequalities in tax rates betlveen poorer and wealthier districts. On the basis of expert 
testimony, the court found that the methods of providing state aid subsidized the 
wealthier districts at the expense of the poorer ones instead of equalizing expendi-
tures. 337 F. Supp. at 282. The court accepted the Serrano rationale that education is a 
fundamental interest and wealth is a suspect classification. 337 F. Supp. at 282-83. The 
court concluded that there was no compelling state interest capable of justifying the 
Texas school financing system. 337 F. Supp. at 284. 
39. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972). 
40. Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. Maricopa County, Ariz,, Jan. 13, 
1972). 
41. Sweetlll'ater County Planning Comm. for the Organization of School Dlsts. v. 
Hinkle, 491 P .2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971). 
42. Suits have been filed in Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, 
Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin. See Comment, supra note 3, at 200-13 for a description 
of the litigation. 
43. See generally Deuelopments in the Law-oEqual Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 
1065, 1077-1131 (1969). 
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objective.44 While the scope of this inquiry is uncertain, the legisla-
tion in controversy clearly bears a presumption of validity.45 
However, when a classification affects certain "fundamental in-
terests" or is "inherently suspect," the Court applies a much stricter 
standard of review.46 Under this standard, the state must first demon-
strate that its statutory classification is necessary for the achievement 
of a "compelling state interest."47 In addition, it must show that the 
classification is precisely tailored to further the purpose it is designed 
to accomplish.48 Finally, the state must prove that there is no less 
onerous alternative by which its objective may be achieved.49 To 
date, the Court has recognized voting,50 fair criminal procedure,61 
interstate travel, 52 and procreation53 as "fundamental interests" that 
deserve special protection under the fourteenth amendment. Fur-
thermore, it has declared that classifications based on race, 54 ances-
tty, 65 or alienage56 are "inherently suspect" and thus subject to 
scrutiny under the strict standard. 
B. Should Current Educational Financing Systems Be 
Subjected to Strict Scrutiny? 
I. The Serrano Rationale 
The strict standard of review was first applied in educational 
:financing litigation by the California supreme court in Serrano v. 
Priest. The court based its decision on its recognition of education 
as a fundamental interest57 and, alternatively, on the proposition that 
discriminations based upon wealth are suspect classi:6.cations.68 The 
44. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
45. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-80 (1911). 
46. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967). 
47. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969). 
48. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969). 
49. E.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
50. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
51. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
52. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
53. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
54. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
55. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
56. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
57. 5 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18. A thorough 
analysis of the arguments that education is a fundamental interest can be found in 
PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 339-93, 409-19. See also Silard 
8: White, supra note 3, at 16-20; Kirp, supra note 3, at 642-46; Horowitz, supra note 3, 
at 1162. 
58. 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 587 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610. For an analysis of the 
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court conceded that no authority had explicitly recognized education 
as a fundamental interest.59 But it observed that education has an 
impact on society and the individual comparable to that of voting 
and fair criminal procedure, both of which had been previously rec-
ognized as fundamental interests.60 In support of its position, the 
court relied heavily on policy arguments advanced by the authors of 
Private Wealth and Public Education, 61 Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, 
who reasoned that education's role as a means of entry into the main-
stream of American society, the universality of its effects, its con-
tinuity over a lengthy period of time, its role in molding the individ-
ual's personality, and the fact that it is made compulsory by state 
law distinguish it as a fundamental interest.62 
As authority for the alternative proposition that wealth is a sus-
pect classification, the court cited Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
tions,63 in which the United States Supreme Court invalidated a 
Virginia poll tax under the equal protection clause; Griffin v. Illi-
nois,64 in which the Court held that the state must provide an in-
digent with a transcript on appeal; and Douglas v. California,0G in 
which the Court held that the state must provide an indigent with 
counsel on appeal. Language in these cases indicated that the Court 
disfavored classifications based upon wealth. Concluding that wealth 
classifications are inherently suspect, the court found that the Cali-
fornia financing system discriminated on the basis of wealth since 
the amount of revenue that a district could raise to support its schools 
was largely dependent on the wealth of the district in terms of tax-
able property.66 The court observed that the discrimination was two-
significance of wealth as a suspect classification in the educational financing context, 
see PRIVATE WEALTH AND PuBuc EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 359-76; Silard &: White, 
supra note 3, at 19-20. 
59. 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P .2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615. The court cited a 
number of United States and California supreme court cases for their dicta describing 
the extreme importance of education in society. Most of these cases dealt with racial 
discrimination in education and therefore did not reach the question of whether 
education is a fundamental interest. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
60. 5 Cal. 3d at 602-08, 487 P.2d at 1257-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18, The court 
noted that education affects even more people than the criminal process and contributes 
to reduction of the crime rate as well. The court observed further that education 
promotes more meaningful voting by providing citizens a better understanding of 
public issues. For an extended comparison of the interests of criminal procedure and 
voting with education, see PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 
363-73. 
61. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3. 
62. 5 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19. 
63. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
64. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
65. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
66. 5 Cal. 3d at 598-600, 487 P.2d at 1250-51, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11. 
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fold since the wealthier districts could provide higher educational 
expenditures with a lower tax rate.67 
On the basis of its finding-s that the California school financing 
system established a classification that both affected a fundamental 
interest and was inherently suspect, the court in Serrano subjected 
the system to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. 68 The 
court did not reach the question whether local control over financial 
decision-making was a compelling state interest since it concluded 
that the California system of financing public education did not 
promote local control.69 Consequently, the court concluded that if 
the plaintiffs could sustain the allegations of their complaint at trial, 
the California method of financing public education would be de-
clared unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection in violation 
of the fourteenth amendment.70 
The Serrano decision to apply the strict standard of review to 
classifications affecting education and based upon wealth has been 
followed by two federal district courts.71 Nevertheless, there is sub-
stantial question whether this decision is consistent with the trend 
in recent Supreme Court equal protection cases. Harper v. Virginia 
Board of Elections and Shapiro v. Thompson72 suggested that the 
Supreme Court was willing to extend the strict standard of review 
into new areas. More recently, however, the Court apparently has 
become concerned over the potentially expanded application of the 
strict standard. As a result the Court may be unwilling to recognize 
any new fundamental interests or suspect classifications or even to 
adhere to the broader dicta in some of the cases concerning the appli-
cation of the strict standard. 
The Second Circuit recognized the Supreme Court's apparent 
desire to restrict application of the strict equal protection standard 
when it decided Johnson v. New York State Education Depart-
ment. 73 Although Johnson did not involve the issue of educational 
67. The court noted that the foundation program only partially alleviated the 
disparities created by variations in district wealth. It also declared that "the ratio of 
resources to pupils" within a given district was the only significant index: of district 
wealth. The court concluded that simply because a district could raise more money by 
taxing itself at a higher rate did not alter the fact that the amount of money available 
for education is dependent upon the wealth of the local property since many districts 
were too poor to compete with the wealthier districts. 5 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 487 P .2d at 
1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612. o 
68. 5 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 487 P.2d at 1259-60, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20. 
69. 5 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 487 P.2d at 1259-60, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620. See notes 226 & 
250 infra, 
70. 5 Cal. 3d at 614-15, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623. 
71. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. 1 
Tex. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. June 7, 1972); Van Dusartz v. 
Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971). 
72. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
73. 449 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 916 (1972). 
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financing, it did examine the question of which standard of review 
is applicable to statutes that establish wealth classifications in the 
area of public education. Section 701 of the New York Education 
Laws required local school boards to provide textbooks for all chil-
dren in grades seven through twelve who resided within the district 
regardless of whether they attended public or private schools.74 
Section 703 required that school boards also supply free textbooks 
to children in grades one through six if the voters in the district au-
thorized a tax for that purpose.75 The plaintiffs, who were mothers 
of children enrolled in the New York State school system, filed suit 
on behalf of themselves, their children, and other children similarly 
situated. They alleged that the textbook statutes created an irra-
tional classification between children in the upper grades and chil-
dren in the lower grades and violated the equal protection clause by 
imposing a requirement that those in the lower grades obtain voter 
approval in order to receive free textbooks.76 Plaintiffs also alleged 
that they were deprived of equal educational opportunity because 
they were too poor to pay the price or the rental fees for the text-
books and were forced to send their children to school without 
texts.77 Confronted with the question of which standard of review 
to apply in reviewing the New York statutes, the court cited the re-
cent Supreme Court case of Dandridge v. Williams78 for the proposi-
tion that "in the area of economics and social welfare, even where 
such legislation involves 'basic economic needs of impoverished 
human beings,' 'the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts 
no power to impose upon the State their views of what constitutes 
wise economic or social policy.' "79 Concluding that the traditional 
standard was the appropriate standard of review, the court found 
that given the finite amount of state resources, the classification 
created by the textbook statutes was rationally related to the legisla-
tive purpose of encouraging the study of upper-grade subjects such as 
science, mathematics, and foreign languages.80 The court then cited 
James v. Valtierra81 as foreclosing the plaintiffs' claims that an unfair 
burden had been placed on the children in the lower grades to pro• 
cure voter approval for funding of free texts.82 
74. N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 701 (McKinney 1969). 
75. N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 703 (McKinney 1969). The state provided a~istancc of ten 
dollars per pupil toward the purchase of texts. 
76. 449 F .2d at 873. 
77. 449 F.2d at 880. 
78. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
79. 449 F.2d at 876-77, quoting 397 U.S. at 485, 486. 
80. 449 F.2d at 876-78. 
81. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). For a discu~ion of Yaltierra, sec notes 130-37 infra and 
accompanying text. 
82. 449 F.2d at 878. 
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Finally, the appellate court turned its attention to the argument, 
raised in an amicus brief, that once the state attempts to provide 
public education it incurs a duty to provide free textbooks as well.83 
After considering the applicability of some of the cases involving 
fundamental interests as well as those suggesting that wealth might 
be a suspect classification, the court dismissed this argument with 
an allusion to Dandridge.84 
While the New York textbook statutes arguably created a wealth 
classification that affected access to public education, the Second Cir-
cuit in Johnson apparently felt that Dandridge precluded application 
of the stricter standard of review.85 On the other hand, the California 
supreme court never mentioned Dandridge when it held in Serrano 
that the state's school financing system created a classification that 
warranted strict scrutiny. Clearly, judicial interpretation of Dan-
dridge has a critical effect on the standard of equal protection review 
applicable to discrimination in the area of education. 
2. Does Dandridge Foreclose Recognition of Education 
as a "Fundamental Interest''? 
Dandridge involved a constitutional challenge to a Maryland 
regulation enacted in connection with the state's participation in 
the federal program of Aid to Dependent Children. The Court held 
that the regulation, which placed a maximum limitation on the size 
of the assistance payment a family was eligible to receive,86 did not 
deny recipients with large families equal protection of the laws. 
After determining that the strict standard was inapplicable, the 
Court applied the traditional standard of review and found that the 
regulation was rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of 
"encouraging employment and avoiding discrimination between wel-
fare families and the families of the working poor."87 The Court 
observed: 
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications 
made by its laws are imperfect. . . . 
83. 449 F .2d at 878-80. This argument is based on an analogy to Griffen v. Illinois 
and Douglas v. California, in which the Court held that if a state provides an appellate 
process, it must allow the indigent meaningful access to that process by providing him 
with a free transcript and free counsel. 
84. 449 F .2d at 879. 
85. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kaufman expressed some of the same theories 
that were relied upon in Serrano arguing that education is an area of fundamental 
importance and that the state must demonstrate a compelling interest in order to 
justify conditioning its exercise upon the payment of money. 449 F.2d at 881-82. 
86. Due to the maximum grant limitation, large families would not be able to 
receive the amount of assistance defined by the state as necessary to meet their needs. 
397 U.S. at 474-75. 
87. 397 U.S. at 486. 
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. . The administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast 
[with business regulation cases], involves the most basic economic 
needs of impoverished human beings. We recognize the dramatically 
real factual difference . . . but we can find no basis for applying a 
different constitutional standard. . . . [T]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States 
their views of what constitutes ·wise economic or social policy. 
• • . [T]he intractable economic, social and even philosophical 
problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not 
the business of this Court. ss 
Read broadly, · this language is ominous. It could suggest that the 
strict standard of review is never applicable to classifications with 
respect to social and economic welfare, including public assistance, 
housing, education, and ordinary municipal services.80 
However, the holding in Dandridge was directed only at the 
validity of the Maryland AFDC maximum grant regulation. There-
fore, the foreboding language might be characterized as dicta and 
need not be read as controlling the question of whether education 
merits stricter judicial protection under the fourteenth amendment. 
Alternatively, it might be argued that the language in Dandridge 
was simply not intended to encompass education. Education is an 
important and unique institution in society, and the Court may not 
have intended to foreclose independent inquiry into whether it 
is a fundamental interest. 
Thus it appears that there are means by which those who seek to 
promote education as a fundamental interest can circumvent the 
language of Dandridge. Nevertheless, the rationale of the opinion 
raises serious doubts about the recognition of education as a fun-
damental interest. The statement quoted above seemed to be spe-
cifically aimed at rejecting the contention that there is a fundamental 
88. 397 U.S. at 485-87. 
89. The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REv. 33, 60 (1970) [hereinafter 
Supreme Court, 1969 Term]; Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1395. 
Arguably, the foreboding language of Dandridge may have been aimed primarily 
at limiting the increasing amount of "substantive" challenges to public assistance 
legislation in the judicial branch. See Reinstein, Welfare Cases: Fundamental Rights, 
tlze Poor and the Burden of Proof in Constitutional Legislation, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 21, 50 
(1970). Only weeks earlier, however, the Court had sustained a significant "procedural" 
challenge to "welfare" legislation in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The 
Dandridge Court might have been less receptive to "substantive" challenges to public 
assistance legislation, for fear of impeding the plans for totally restructuring the 
welfare system which were under consideration in the legislative and executive 
branches of government. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 677 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); Reinstein, supra, at 50. However, the Court's invalidation of "substantive" 
limitations on eligibility for public assistance under the equal protection clause in 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and under the supremacy clause in 
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971), casts doubt on this theory. 
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interest in subsistence,00 which suggests that the importance of an in-
terest alone is not sufficient to warrant its characterization as fun-
damental.91 
Assuming that the best possible case has been made for the im-
portance of education in our society, it is questionable whether this 
is sufficient to sustain the proposition that education is a funda-
mental interest given Dandridge's treatment of subsistence under the 
equal protection clause. The Serrano rationale for giving education 
exalted status appears to apply with equal force to subsistence bene-
fits. 92 Subsistence benefits are at least as important to the individual 
and society as education, even by the Serrano court's own terms. First, 
Serrano suggested that education helps maintain "free enterprise 
democracy" and is the bright hope of the underprivileged to gain 
entry "into the mainstream of American society."93 But nothing, in-
cluding education, is more important to the poor than the means of 
daily subsistence, which are often obtained only through public 
assistance programs.94 Children who do not have enough to eat, nor 
adequate housing or clothing cannot be expected to achieve their 
academic potential even if they are afforded equal educational op-
portunity. 95 
Second, the Serrano court maintained that education, unlike 
other municipal services, is universally relevant because it benefits 
all members of society. The California supreme court noted that 
while "'[r]elatively few are on welfare[,] [e]very person benefits 
from education.' "96 While education has a more universal effect 
upon society than does the right of indigents to receive subsistence 
benefits, there is certainly nothing more universal than the need of 
90. Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudication, 
58 CALIF. L. REv. 555, 598-600 (1970); Reinstein, supra note 89, at 44; Note, Equal 
Protection-Cease Fire in the War on Poverty, 36 Mo. L. REv. 117, 124-26 (1971). 
The decision to apply the strict standard of review in Shapiro was based on the 
fact that the classification involved there affected the fundamental right to interstate 
travel. Nevertheless, the Court's statement in Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627, that many 
families depend on assistance benefits "to obtain the very means to subsist-food, 
shelter, and other necessities of life" suggested to some commentators that the 
recognition of a fundamental right to subsistence might be on the horizon. See 
Michelman, supra note 3, at 40; Reinstein, supra, at 50. Such a conclusion finds addi-
tional support in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970). 
91. See Dienes, supra note 90, at 598-600. 
92. Goldstein, supra note 3, at 540-41. 
93. 5 Cal. 3d at 609, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19. 
94. Brest, Book Review, 23 STAN. L. REv. 591, 607 (1971). 
95. H. BmcH &: J. Gussow, DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN: HEALTII, NUTRITION AND SCHOOL 
FAILURE, Preface, at xi-xiii, 7, 265-67 (1970). See also Deutsch, The Disadvantaged 
Child and the Leaming Process, in EDUCATION IN DEPRESSED AREAs 163 (A. Passow ed. 
1963). 
96. 5 Cal. 3d at 609, 487 P .2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619, quoting Educational 
opportunity, supra note 3, at 388. 
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all men to receive those basics that ensure their daily existence.07 If 
there are grounds for a distinction between education and subsistence 
upon this point, it is not because the need for or effects of education 
are more universal than subsistence, but merely because the state 
plays a larger role in providing education than it does in providing 
subsistence benefits.98 Third, the California court noted that, unlike 
most other government services, education continues over a lengthy 
period of time.99 Certainly welfare benefits are not designed to sus-
tain their recipient indefinitely, but poverty is not a short-term 
affair. It is conceivable that, as with education, the need for sub-
sistence benefits might continue for an extended period of time. 
Fourth, the Court stated that "education is unmatched in the 
extent to which it molds the personality of the youth of society."100 
It is arguable, however, that the provision of basic necessities such as 
adequate food, clothing, and housing has an unparalleled effect on 
the development of the child. In fact, denial of these essentials may 
well frustrate efforts to educate the underprivileged.101 Unrelieved 
poverty during the early years of a child's existence may leave a scar 
on his psyche for the rest of his life.102 Finally, Serrano argued that 
"education is so important that the state has made it compulsory."108 
Subsistence is so important, however, that it is unnecessary for the 
state to make it compulsory.104 
The Serrano court, noting that the Supreme Court has character-
ized the fundamental right of voting as preservative of other rights,1011 
implied that education is also a preservative right in the sense that it 
ensures intelligent political participation in the process that is• pro-
tected by the right to vote.106 But the necessities secured by welfare 
benefits are preservative of life itself or at least of life at the mini-
97. Brest, supra note 94, at 608. 
98. Many more individuals depend on the state for the provision of education than 
for the provision of subsistence benefits. Yet it would be ironic to grant extra judicial 
protection to one area of fundamental importance because so many people are affected 
and deny extra judicial protection to another area equally important to the individual 
because fewer people are affected. Where many people might be adversely affected, there 
is at least some potential for eradicating the problem through the political process, But 
in an area such as subsistence payments, the minority whose rights are affected would 
have little hope of influencing reform through normal political channels, 
99. 5 Cal. 3d at 609, 487 P .2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619. 
100. 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619, 
101. See authorities cited in note 95 supra. 
102. Id. 
103. 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P .2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619. See Horowitz, supra 
note 3, at 1170. 
104. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 538-40. 
105. 5 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 487 P .2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618, citing Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). 
106. See PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 371-72. Cf. First 
Appraisal, supra note 3, at 114. 
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mum standard that society considers acceptable. Given the Court's 
refusal to characterize subsistence as a fundamental interest and the 
difficulty in distinguishing education from subsistence, it is unlikely 
that the Court will find a place in the fundamental interest category 
for education. 
Reliance upon Dandridge and the lack of a distinction between 
education and subsistence apparently convinced the Second Circuit 
in Johnson not to apply the strict standard of review to New York's 
textbook statute. As the court pointed out: "[A]lthough education is 
no doubt an area of fundamental importance, the Supreme Court 
has made clear its view that in the area of social welfare, the 'com-
pelling state interest' theory does not apply even though basic needs 
may be involved."107 The court continued in a footnote, "Certainly, 
no one would contend that a student's need for textbooks is any more 
fundamental than such items as food and clothing which are pro-
vided through welfare grants."10s 
Supreme Court decisions after Dandridge emphasize that the 
Court intends to restrict its recognition of new fundamental inter-
ests. In Lindsey v. Normet,109 the Court held that a statute that 
required tenants who sought to appeal from an adverse judgment in 
a forceable-entry suit to post a bond for double the amount of rent 
due violated the equal protection clause by discouraging the right 
to appeal. In reaching its decision, however, the Court rejected the 
contention that " 'the need for decent shelter' " or " 'the right to 
retain peaceful possession of one's home' " are fundamental interests 
and.declared, "We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe 
and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial 
remedies for every social and economic ill."110 Like the right to sub-
sistence, the right to housing compares favorably in importance with 
education. Thus the California supreme court's rationale for recog-
nizing education as a fundamental interest is not consistent with cur-
rent equal protection doctrine, represented by Dandridge and Lind-
sey. 
While it is clear that the importance of an interest does not of 
necessity make it fundamental, the Supreme Court has never firmly 
defined the characteristics of a "fundamental interest" under the 
equal protection clause.111 However, Dandridge suggested a criterion 
107. 449 F .2d at 879. 
108. 449 F .2d at 879 n.11. 
109. 405 U.S. 56 (1972). 
110. 405 U.S. at 74. The rejection of a fundamental right to housing was fore-
shadowed by the Court's failure to consider this contention in Valtierra. See The 
Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 40, 130 (1971) [hereinafter Supreme 
Court, 1970 Term]. 
111. See Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human 
Rights, 80 HARv. L. R.Ev. 91, 91-95 (1966). For a discussion of some of the factors that 
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that the Court may consider significant in the future. In a footnote, 
the Court suggested that the "constitutionally protected" nature of 
the right involved in Shapiro v. Thompson may have been the con-
trolling factor in the decision to apply the strict standard of review 
in that case.112 In Lindsey, the Court emphasized its inability "to 
perceive in that document [the Constitution] any constitutional 
guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality or any recog-
nition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his land-
lord beyond the term of his lease .... "113 
There is good reason for attempting to limit the fundamental 
interest category. Every application of the strict standard of review 
necessarily involves abandonment of the traditional presumption of 
validity that the Court normally accords legislation. The Court 
the Court has considered in deciding whether to accord special protection to a given 
interest, see Supreme Court, 1969 Term, supra note 89, at 65-66; Comment, supra note 
3, at 115-22. 
112. 397 U.S. at 484 n.16. The theory that fundamental interests must be the subject 
of independent constitutional protection first appeared in Justice Harlan's dissent in 
Harper (383 U.S. at 682 n.3) and Shapiro (394 U.S. at 661-62) and Justice Stewart's 
concurrence in Shapiro (394 U.S. at 643). It is not clear what the Court would require 
in terms of independent constitutional protection. For example, in Shapiro the Court 
held that the right to interstate travel was constitutionally protected but declined "to 
ascribe the source of this right ••• to a particular constitutional provision," 394 U.S. 
at 630. Justice Harlan, who was not satisfied with this analysis, concluded that the 
right to interstate travel must be found in the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. 394 U.S. at 671. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that the recognized fundamental interests of voting 
and fair criminal procedure are not "constitutionally protected," Supreme Court, 1969 
Term, supra note 89, at 65; Reinstein, supra note 89, at 42, See also Michelman, supra 
note 3, at 17 n.25. For example, in Griffin v. Illinois, the Court noted that the states 
were not constitutionally required to provide an appellate process. 351 U.S. at 18. In 
Harper, the Court declined to link the right to vote in state elections to anything more 
specific than the equal protection clause, although it intimated that the right might 
be found in the first amendment. 383 U.S. at 665. Thus it is unlikely that the Court 
would require that the specific right at issue in a particular case be explicitly pro• 
tected in the text of the Constitution before it can be considered fundamental. Rather, 
a general constitutional reference to the area of interest would probably be sufficient. 
The references to voting in articles I and II and in the twelfth, fourteenth, fifteenth, 
seventeenth, nineteenth, twenty-fourth, and nventy-sLxth amendments would certainly 
provide sufficient independent constitutional protection for that interest. Likewise, the 
fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth amendments should afford constitutional protection 
to fair criminal procedure. But see Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARv. L. R.Ev. 435, 438 (1967). The mere mention of an 
interest in the Constitution, however, such as the right to contract, does not neces-
sarily render it fundamental. 
Surely the Court does not intend to discontinue its practice of strictly scrutinizing 
classifications that affect criminal procedure and voting. Since Dandridge, the Court 
has reaffirmed the applicability of strict review to criminal procedure cases in Williams 
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). Likewise, the 
Court has continued to apply strict review to voting cases such as Bullock v. Carter, 
405 U.S. 134 (1972). See Comment, supra note 3, at 129-30 for the argument that the 
"independent constitutional protection" requirement of Dandridge is an aberration that 
will not preclude the recognition of education as a fundamental interest. 
113. 405 U.S. at 74. 
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might limit its stricter scrutiny to classifications in those areas ex-
pressly mentioned in the text of the Constitution, thereby fulfilling 
its duties as arbiter of the Constitution and at the same time avoid-
ing an overly broad incursion into the legislative function. The 
Court's seemingly ad hoc applications of the strict standard of 
review have exposed it to the criticism that it uses the "fundamental 
interest" doctrine to impose its own value judgments on the nation.114 
The Court may prefer to instill more objectivity and predictability 
into the determination of fundamental interests and thereby to 
dispel the notion that it decides whether to afford extra judicial 
protection to an interest on the basis of the Court's evaluation of 
its importance.116 The requirement of "independent constitutional 
protection" seems to be the most feasible means for accomplishing 
these objectives without abandoning the fundamental interest con-
cept entirely. 
If the Court intends such a limitation, education could claim 
"fundamental" status only through a strained interpretation of an 
"independent constitutional basis," since education is nowhere men-
tioned in the text of the Constitution. Thus, to grant special status 
to education would destroy any hope of infusing more objectivity 
into the selection of fundamental interests. 
There are other reasons for concluding that education will not 
be recognized as a fundamental interest by the Supreme Court. Rec-
ognition of education as a fundamental interest would require the 
Court to scrutinize carefully a great variety of classifications that 
affect access to public education.116 Given the magnitude of public 
education systems in our society, the multitude of classifications that 
are necessary for their operation, and the differences of opinion sur-
rounding educational decision-making, it may be assumed that appli-
cation of the strict standard of review to all classifications in the area 
of public education would result in an undesirable deluge of litiga-
tion. Moreover, even if the Court were ·willing to scrutinize strictly 
discriminations in the area of education, it might refrain from doing 
so for fear of opening the floodgates to strict review of classifications 
that affect other municipal services.117 Education is undoubtedly 
114. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676 (Black, J., dissenting). 
115. Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 110, at 130; Supreme Court, 1969 
Term, supra note 89, at 64. 
116. But the Court has suggested that the strict standard is not automatically 
applicable whenever a classification imposes an incidental burden on a fundamental 
interest. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971). The same reasoning would doubt• 
lessly apply to education if it were recognized as a fundamental interest. Nevertheless, 
the Court would still strictly scrutinize many classifications directly affecting education 
that would have created few problems under the traditional test. 
117. The California supreme court rejected the argument that the school financing 
systems should not be invalidated because this would lead to similar action in respect to 
other municipal services. 5 Cal. 3d at 613-14, 487 P.2d at 1262-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 
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more important than most other municipal services, but, arguably, 
it is no more crucial than police, fire, and sanitation services. The 
Court may prefer not to weigh the importance of all types of munici-
pal services and select those that are critical enough to merit "special" 
equal protection. To escape the burden of making fine distinctions, 
the Court may simply elect to withhold fundamental interest recogni-
tion from all municipal services, including education.118 
3. Do Current Educational Financing Systems Create Inherently 
Suspect Classifications? 
An alternative ground for the California supreme court's deci-
sion to scrutinize strictly the state's school financing program was 
that it created a wealth classification and that such classifications are 
inherently suspect.119 The cases that arguably support the proposi-
622-23. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 414-19 suggests that the 
five policy reasons on which the California supreme court based its recognition of 
education as a fundamental interest (see notes 92-104 supra and accompanying text) 
provide a means for distinguishing education from other municipal services. See also 
Comment, supra note 3, at 154-64 for a discussion of the significance of Serrano to the 
equalization of other municipal services under the fourteenth amendment. 
Nevertheless, some lawyers apparently are convinced that recognition of education 
as a fundamental interest will spawn effective challenges to unequal provision of all 
municipal services. Andrews, Tax 'Revolution' School Ruling Is Seen Changing the 
Nature of U.S., Cities, Suburbs, Wall St. J., March 13, 1972, at I, col. 6; at 10, col. 6 
[hereinafter Andrews]: 
Serrano "opens a very large door," says John Silard, a Washington, D.C., 
attorney involved in school-tax litigation. For the first time, he says, the courts are 
requiring "equal protection" in public programs. • • • In his view, this means "a 
revolution in [public] services." The schools, he predicts, are merely "the first bite 
at the big apple. Welfare obviously comes next, and I guess health, too." 
Perhaps understandably, the lawyers closest to the Serrano suits play down 
talk of sweeping revisions m public services. The success of their litigation depends 
in good part on a painstaking legal theory that education is something special-
"a fundamental interest" in constitutional parlance • 
• • • Some lawyers predict that if education is accepted as a fundamental 
interest other public services are bound to follow. But they don't like to say it 
out loud. "They want this to stick," one attorney says. ''You stress that education 
isn't like garbage. We arc playing a game here. You have to [in order] not to 
frighten the courts away from a proposition that's sound." 
Apparently, these lawyers are convinced that Supreme Court Justices do not read The 
Wall Street Journal. 
Currently the leading case involving discrimination in tl1e provision of municipal 
services is Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (1971), in which the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a municipality may not discriminate on tlte 
basis of race in the provision of such services as sewage facilities, paved streets, lighting 
and fire hydrants. See generally Ratner, Inter-Neighborhood Denials of Equal Protec-
tion in the Provision of Municipal Services, 4 HARv. CIV. RicHTS-C1v. Lm. L. REv. 1 
(1968); Note, The Right to Equal Municipal Services, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 568 (1971). 
118. Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note llO, at 130; Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 
supra note 89, at 70. 
119. 5 Cal. 3d at 597-98, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610. 
For a discussion of whether wealth is or should be a suspect classification, sec 
PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDucATION, supra note 3, at 339-76; Michelman, supra 
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tion that wealth is a suspect classification are primarily concerned 
with individual rather than collective wealth.120 The Serrano court 
accepted as true on demurrer the plaintiff's allegations that there 
was a positive correlation between the wealth of the districts in terms 
of taxable property and the personal wealth of the districts' inhabi-
tants.121 This conclusion may be hasty, given the presence of substan-
tial amounts of valuable commercial and industrial property in 
districts inhabited by the poor.122 Thus it is questionable whether 
the plaintiffs ·will be able to establish that poor people as such are 
singled out and victimized by current school financing systems. But 
the court declared that, regardless of such a correlation, discrimina-
tions based upon district wealth were as equally "suspect" as discrim-
inations based upon individual wealth.123 The court reasoned that 
the amount of money spent on a child's education should not depend 
upon the presence or absence of valuable commercial and industrial 
property within his school district.124 Furthermore, in responding to 
the contention that this wealth discrimination was unintentional, 125 
the court noted that the governmental action was in large part re-
sponsible for the intradistrict disparities in taxable property since 
the financing system was mandated by the state constitution and 
statutes, the distribution of valuable property was partially con-
trolled by zoning and land-use ordinances, and the school district 
note 3; Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection_ and the 
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 785-87 (1969); Comment, supra note 3, at 130-48; Note, 
Exclusionary Zoning, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1645, 1650-62 (1971); Note, Snob Zoning: Must 
a Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 MICH. L. REv. 339, 344-48 (1970). 
120. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 {1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 
(1963); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). It has been 
suggested that in these cases the effect of the wealth discrimination was total depriva-
tion of the commodities involved since the indigent was too poor to afford a transcript, 
hire an attorney, or pay the poll tax. In the educational financing situation, the 
deprivation is only partial since a minimum amount of money is spent on the 
education of all children. See Kirp &: Yudof, supra note 3, at 147 n.3. The Supreme 
Court might consider this distinction crucial. 
121. 5 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 487 P .2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612. 
122. First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 114. But see Rodriguez v. San Antonio Inde-
pendent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282 (1971) where it is suggested that such a cor-
relation does exist in Texas, and Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 243-46, 387 
A.2d 187, 199-205 (1972) for the assertion that this correlation exists in New Jersey. 
123. 5 Cal. 3d at 601, 487 P .2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612. 
124. 5 Cal. 3d at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13. 
125. 5 Cal. 3d at 601-03, 487 P.2d at 1253-54, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613-14. The court 
declared that it was not necessary that the discrimination be intentional in order to 
constitute a denial of equal protection. It noted that classifications invalidated by the 
Supreme Court in Griffen, Douglas, and Harper were not purposefully discriminatory. 
Along the same lines, the Serrano court rejected the defendant's analogy that the 
wealth discriminations were constitutional since they were comparable to de facto 
segregation. The court emphasized the degree of state action involved and noted that 
California has declared de facto school segregation unconstitutional. 5 Cal. 3d at 601-04, 
487 P.2d at 1253-55, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613-15. 
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boundaries were drawn by the government.120 Given these factors, 
if the Supreme Court is ·willing to accept the characterization of 
wealth as a suspect classification at all, it might be willing to apply 
the principle to wealth discriminations between districts as well as 
between individuals. 
In concluding that wealth is a suspect classification, the Serrano 
court quoted the Supreme Court's statement in Harper v. Virginia 
Board of Elections that " '[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or 
property, like those of race ... , are traditionally disfavored' "127 and 
the Court's assertion in 1v.IcDonald v. Board of Election Commis-
sioners128 that " 'a careful examination on our part is especially war-
ranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth .•. [a factor] 
which would independently render a classification highly suspect and 
thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny.' "129 The fact 
remains, however, that every case in which the Court has applied 
the stricter standard of review to classifications based on "wealth" 
also involved the fundamental interests of voting or fair criminal 
procedure; the presence of wealth classifications alone has not yet 
activated the strict standard of review. 
To the contrary, the recent case of James v. Valtierra strongly 
suggests that wealth is not a suspect classification. In Valtierra, the 
Court held that the California constitution's provision that low-rent 
housing projects could not be developed or constructed by the state 
until "approved by the voters in a local referendum"180 was not a 
denial of equal protection of the laws.181 The Court distinguished132 
Hunter v. Ericksen,133 which held that an amendment to the Akron, 
Ohio, City Charter requiring voter approval of any ordinance regu-
lating real estate on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin 
violated the equal protection clause. The Court quoted from Hunter 
the observation that " 'racial classifications are "constitutionally 
suspect" ... and subject to the "most rigid scrutiny.'' ... They "bear 
126. 5 Cal. 3d at 603, 487 P.2d at 1259-60, 96 Cal. Rptr. 619-20. 
127. 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610, qttoting 383 U.S. at 
668. But see Michelman, supra note 3, at 24-25, where it is suggested that Harper is 
more appropriately interpreted as a statement on voting rights than as a statement on 
wealth classifications. See also Cox, supra note 111, at 95-96, 
128. 394 U.S. 802 (1969). 
129. 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d 1250, 96 Cal, Rptr. at 610, qttoting 394 U.S. at 807, 
In McDonald, plaintiff alleged that an Illinois statute denied equal protection of the 
laws to prisoners unable to obtain bail since it did not include them in the category of 
persons allowed to vote by absentee ballot. After it characterized wealth as a suspect 
classification, however, the Court held that no classification based upon wealth was 
involved since the petitioners had not shown that they were denied the right to vote, 
130. CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV. 
131. 402 U.S. at 143. 
132, 402 U.S. at 140-41. 
133. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
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a far heavier burden of justification" than other classifications.' "134 
The Court noted, however, that there was nothing in the record to 
suggest that the California law was implicitly intended to discrimi-
nate against a racial minority.185 Thus the Court concluded, "The 
present case could be affirmed only by extending Hunter and this 
we decline to do."136 
In his dissent in Valtierra, Justice Marshall argued that "[t]he 
article [of the California constitution] explicitly singles out low-
income persons to bear its burden .... It is ... an explicit classifica-
tion on the basis of poverty-a suspect classification which demands 
exacting judicial scrutiny .... "131 Given the thrust of Justice Mar-
shall's dissent, the majority's emphasis on the "suspect classification 
of race" involved in Hunter, and its stated refusal to extend Hunter, 
the implication is strong that the Court did not regard a discrimina-
tion on the basis of wealth alone as a suspect classification capable 
of activating the strict standard of review. But since the majority 
did not directly address this issue, it is presumably still open.138 
Commentators have suggested, however, that there are critical 
differences between such previously recognized suspect classifications 
as race and ancestry and classifications based upon wealth. It is more 
difficult to identify the poor as a discrete group than it is to identify 
distinct racial and national minorities.1311 In addition, wealth is a 
matter of degree, rather than kind.140 Thus, wealth classifications are 
less obviously arbitrary than, for example, racial discriminations. 
134. 402 U.S. at 141, quoting 393 U.S. at 391-92. 
135. 402 U.S. at 141. 
136. 402 U.S. at 141. 
137. 402 U.S. at 144-45. Justice Marshall observed that by its own terms article 
XXXIV is applicable only to "any development composed of urban or rural dwellings, 
apartments or other living accommodations for persons of low income, financed in 
whole or in part by the Federal Government or a state public body." Persons of low 
income are defined as "persons or families who lack the amount of income which is 
necessary ••• to enable them, without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe and 
sanitary dwellings, without overcrowding." 402 U.S. at 143-44. 
This is probably the most explicit discrimination based on wealth that the Court is 
likely to encounter. 
138. The Supreme Court has declined the opportunity to characterize wealth as a 
suspect classification in some recent cases. One example is Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 
U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to condition 
access to the courts in divorce proceedings on the payment of filing fees. Despite a 
long line of decisions concerning indigents' rights in criminal proceedings based on 
the equal protection as well as the due process clause, the Court limited its holding to 
due process. The Court attempted to restrict further the 5'\leep of its holding by 
emphasizing the importance of marriage in our society. 401 U.S. at 376. Both 
Justices Douglas and Brennan argued, in concurring opinions, that an equal 
protection rationale would have been more appropriate. 401 U.S. at 383-86, 386-89. 
Cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). 
139. See Note, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1645, supra note 119, at 1659. But there are at 
least some standards for identifying the poor. Id. 
140. Id, 
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Furthermore, poverty, unlike race or ancestry, is a remediable con-
dition.141 Finally, classifications involving the payment of money are 
accepted as necessary to our economic system.142 In view of these 
differences the Court might not be as willing to review classifications 
based on wealth as strictly as those based on race, ancestry, or 
alienage.143 
It should be noted that the recognition of wealth as a suspect 
classification would be potentially even more expansive than recog-
nition of education as a fundamental interest.144 Such a precedent 
would require the application of the strict standard whenever a 
plaintiff alleged that a wealthier district was able to provide better 
police protection, fire protection, park service, or sewage disposal. 
It would be unnecessary to argue that there is a fundamental inter-
est in these services if the presence of wealth discrimination alone 
were sufficient to warrant strict scrutiny. Practically any statute that 
conditions reception of a benefit or avoidance of a burden on pay-
ment of a fee or on financial status would be subject to serious 
challenge.145 It is unlikely the Court would be willing to adopt this 
doctrine since it would involve the Court in a series of sweeping 
economic reforms that could only be characterized as "legislative" 
in nature. 
4. Does the Combination of Wealth Discrimination in the Area of 
Education Require the Strict Standard of Review? 
Traditionally, it has been assumed that either a fundamental 
interest or a suspect criterion is sufficient to warrant application of 
the strict standard of review to a legislative classification.146 The 
propositions that education is a fundamental interest and that wealth 
classifications are inherently suspect are apparently inconsistent with 
the current trend in Supreme Court decisions.147 However, the 
141. Sager, supra note 119, at 787. 
142. Id. at 786. 
143. But for the argument that the poor deserve extra protection under the equal 
protection clause due to their lack of political strength, see Michelman, supra note 3, 
at 21; Note, 84 HAR.v. L. REv. 1615, supra note 119, at 1658-61; Supreme Court, 1970 
Term, supra note 110, at 128-29. 
144. The Court appears to be concerned with restricting the further expansion of 
the suspect classification category as well as the category of fundamental interests. For 
example, despite some promising dicta in earlier cases, the Court recently declined to 
recognize illegitimacy as a suspect classification. Compare Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 
532 (1971), with Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: 
Surety Co., 40 U.SL.W. 4460 (U.S. April 24, 1972). 
145. See Michelman, supra note 3, for the possible distinction between "payment" 
and "wealth" classifications, and for an alternative approach to protecting the poor 
under the equal protection clause. 
146. See, e.g., Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971). 
147. Yet another theory might be drawn from the opinion in Serrano. The court 
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California court in Serrano may have been justified in applying the 
strict standard to the state's school :financing system due to the exis-
tence of a classification that affected education and was based on 
wealth.148 The Supreme Court may be less relucta,nt to extend the 
strict standard to cases that involve both education and wealth clas-
sifications since such an extension would be less expansive than an 
extension to all cases that involve just one of those factors. 
Application of the strict standard to the combination of an im-
portant, but nonfundamental, interest and a disfavored, but non-
suspect, classification would lend itself to either of two possible 
interpretations. On the one hand, it might suggest that the Court is 
recognizing a category of hybrids that will be subjected to strict 
scrutiny. Or it might suggest that the Court will evaluate the relative 
importance of the interest at stake and the invidiousness of the 
classification involved in a given case and adjust the standard of 
review accordingly.149 Both of these possibilities are appealing since 
suggested that the state may not discriminate on a geographical basis where funda-
mental rights or suspect classifications are involved. 5 Cal. 3d at 612, 487 P.2d at 1261, 
96 Cal. Rptr. at 621. The court first drew support from school closing cases in which 
the Supreme Court has invalidated efforts to close schools in one part of the state 
while other schools continued to operate. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 
(1964); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), affd. 
mem., 368 U.S. 515 (1962). These cases, however, are distinguishable from the 
educational financing litigation in that they involved blatant racial discrimination. In 
addition, the children involved were completely denied the opportunity to attend 
public schools rather than merely denied equal educational expenditures. 
The California supreme court also relied upon the reapportionment cases, 
especially Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), to support this proposition. Specifically, 
the court quoted the Supreme Court's statement in Reynolds that " 'Diluting the 
weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discrimination based upon 
factors such as race ••• or economic status •••• ,' " and concluded that "[i)f a voter's 
address may not determine the weight to which his ballot is entitled, surely it should 
not determine the quality of the child's education." 5 Cal. 3d ~t 613, 487 P .2d at 1262, 
96 Cal. Rptr. at 622, quoting 377 U.S. at 566. 
For an extensive analysis of the validity of geographical classifications under the 
equal protection clause, see Horowitz &: Neitring, supra note 3. See also A. WISE, supra 
note 3, at 171-72. But see PRlvATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 
350-55 (the geographical discrimination theory is an inappropriate vehicle for challeng-
ing educational financing systems under the equal protection clause). 
148. It is unclear from the court's opinion in Serrano whether it rested its decision 
on the education-fundamental interest factor, the wealth-suspect criterion factor, or 
a combination of both. It has been suggested that classifications based upon wealth only 
require strict review when coupled with a fundamental interest. PRlvATE WEALTH AND 
Ptmuc EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 344; Note, 69 Mica. L. REv. 339, supra note 119, at 
347. But as Professor Michelman suggests, supra note 3, at 22-23, such an analysis 
implies that the "classification of wealth" is of little significance since the strict 
standard of review wou1d apply in any event because of the fundamental interest 
involved. For example, when voting is at stake, the Court will apply the strict standard 
of review to classifications based upon factors other than wealth. See, e.g., Kramer v. 
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
149. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 111, at 95; Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice 
Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 UCLA L. 
REv. 716, 744 (1969); Comment, supra note 3, at 148-51. 
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they would result in a more flexible approach to equal protection 
questions. However, flexibility necessarily engenders a degree of un-
certainty, and this is a factor that the Court would presumably like 
to minimize in this area.100 
Furthermore, strict scrutiny of the combination of wealth dis-
criminations in the area of education would still expand use of the 
strict standard of review beyond its current perimeters. The Court 
would burden itself with the complex task of value-balancing that it 
apparently desires to avoid. For it would eventually have to deter-
mine whether wealth classifications that affect other important inter-
ests, such as subsistence, housing, and municipal services, warrant 
strict scrutiny despite the fact that the interests involved are not 
"fundamental." Therefore, the Serrano doctrine itself will probably 
receive a great deal of "strict scrutiny" when it is considered by the 
highest court of the land. 
C. School Financing Systems Under the Traditional 
Equal Protection Standard 
Even if the Supreme Court should decide that the strict standard 
of review is inapplicable to the educational financing litigation, 
there remains the possibility of invalidating the systems under the 
traditional equal protection standard.151 While basing their decisions 
on the strict standard, federal courts in Van Dusartz162 and Rodri-
guez163 have indicated that the states' school financing systems might 
not withstand analysis under the rational basis test either. 
In applying the traditional standard of equal protection, the 
Court has stated that a classification must have a " 'fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons simi-
larly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "m Occasionally, however, 
the Court has emphasized the laxity of the traditional approach 
noting that "a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any 
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it"16G or unless 
it is "wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objectives.''160 
In some instances the Court has subjected legislation to only the most 
cursory review,167 accepting purposes of marginal relevance as suf-
150. Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 110, at UIO. 
151. See A. WISE, supra note 3, at 178-84; PRIVATE WEALTII AND PUBLIC .EDUCATION, 
supra note 3, at 334-37: Silard &: White, supra note 3, at 19-20, But see PRIVATE WEALTH 
AND PUBLIC .EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 326-34. 
152. 334 F. Supp. at 874. 
153. 337 F. Supp. at 284. 
154. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). 
155. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). 
156. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). 
157. In Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), tl1c Court upheld a Louisiana statute 
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ficient justification for sustaining the classifications.158 In other cases, 
however, the Court has engaged in a more demanding search for a 
"rational basis" for the legislation in question.159 The Court has 
offered no explanation for these apparent variations in intensity of 
review under the traditional standard. It may be noted, however, that 
the Court has been especially lax in those cases involving business 
regulations,160 and this may be the most appropriate approach in 
these instances. Arguably, the Court exercises a somewhat more de-
manding review of classifications involving personal, but nonfunda-
mental, interests-such as education or subsistence benefits-under 
the traditional standard.161 The success of the challenge to educa-
tional financing under the traditional standard is dependent upon 
such a conscientious search for a rational basis. 
The quest for a rationally related purpose is complicated by the 
fact that complex legislation often bears many purposes, some of 
which may be inconsistent. The determination reached under the 
traditional equal protection standard may be contingent upon what 
is characterized as a legislative purpose. 
Arguably, the dominant purpose of an educational :financing 
method is to create a system of equal educational opportunity.162 
Indeed, many state constitutions contain clauses that guarantee equal 
education to all.168 Considering the large discrepancies in expendi-
tures among school districts that are engendered by the current 
systems, it would seem that they are not rationally related to this 
purpose.164 The legitimate purpose of promoting local control over 
educational spending and decision-making will no doubt be set forth 
that denied the rights of intestate succession to illegitimate children who had not 
been both acknowledged and legitimated. Although the classification was attacked 
under the equal protection clause, the Court decided the case on the ground that the 
state legislature had the power to pass laws regulating intestate succession. 401 U.S. at 
538. In a footnote the Court acknowledged that it could have found a rational basis 
for the classification but failed to say why it was not necessary to do so. 401 U.S. at 
536 n.6. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan charged that the majority's refusal to 
consider the issue in terms of even the restrained standard of review marked a new 
and unfortunate approach to equal protection. 401 U.S. at 548-50. 
158. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (sus• 
taining a New York statute which, as a safety measure, prohibited trucks from carrying 
advertising except when a product of the truck owner was advertised). 
159. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a Massachusetts 
criminal statute which prohibited the gratuitous distribution of contraceptives). 
160. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); 
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). 
161. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
162. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 334. 
163. Id. The court in Van Dusartz commented, "If the State's objective is a 'general 
and uniform system' of education, as Article VIII, Section I of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion declares, it might be wondered whether the means chosen are rationally adapted 
to that goal." 334 F. Supp. at 874. 
164. See PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 335. 
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as a rational basis for the current financing systems. The Mcinnis 
court accepted this rationale, stressing that it was desirable to allow 
local districts to choose their own tax rates and select their own pri-
orities as between education and other municipal services.166 These 
conclusions may not be controlling in the current litigation before 
the Court, however, since the court in Mcinnis also grounded its 
decision upon the lack of judicially manageable standards.166 Com-
mentators have argued that just as much local control could be ob-
tained under more equalized financing systems.167 
But under the traditional standard of review, a state is not re-
quired to utilize the least onerous method for accomplishing its 
purpose,168 thus the existence of a potentially better system would 
not require the invalidation of the current one. However, it is argu-
able that current financing systems do not even effectively encourage 
local control over decision-making since poorer school districts may 
contain so little taxable wealth that they have no effective means £or 
increasing educational expendittires.169 As the Serrano court noted, 
"[A]ffiuent districts can have their cake and eat it too: they can pro-
vide a high quality education for their children while paying lower 
taxes. Poor districts, by contrast have no cake at all.''170 Thus local 
control of decision-making may not be a valid justification for the 
current systems. Nevertheless, the Court could conclude that as long 
as the state does not place an upper limit on the level at which a 
district may tax itself, poorer districts can raise additional revenue 
by taxing themselves at higher rates and thereby retaining a sufficient 
degree of control over revenue. Thus arguments for invalidating the 
:financing systems under the rational basis test are vulnerable.171 
165. 293 F. Supp. at 333. 
166. 293 F. Supp. at 335. 
167. See PRIVATE WEAL111 AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 14-20, 34.35, 306, 
432, for the argument that local control over educational decision-making and spend-
ing (which they characterize as "subsidiarity") can be achieved under a more equalized 
system of educational finance. See note 186 infra for a description of such a system. 
168. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 333 (N.D. ill. 1968), citing Metropolis 
Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 661 (1913). 
169. The court in Van Dusartz doubted whether encouraging local control over 
decision-making provided a rational basis: 
By its own acts, the State has indicated that it is not primarily interested in local 
choice in school matters. In fact, rather than reposing in each school district the 
economic power to fix its own level of per pupil expenditure, the State has so 
arranged the structure as to guarantee that some districts will spend low (with 
high taxes) while others will spend high (with low taxes). To promote such an 
erratic dispersal of privilege and burden on a theory of local control of spending 
would be quite impossible, 
334 F. Supp. at 876. 
170. 5 Cal. 3d at 600, 487 P.2d at 1251-52, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611,12, 
171. See PRIVATE WEAL111 AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 326-34, for 
criticism of the traditional standard of review. 
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Professor Schoettle has suggested a different approach for chal-
lenging educational financing systems under the rational basis test.172 
He argues that financing methods that depend on assessable property 
within individual school districts require voters in poorer districts 
to "bear a heavier burden of electoral persuasion" than those in 
wealthier districts in order to raise similar amounts of revenue for 
the operation of schools.173 Analogizing to Baker v. Carr174 and other 
reapportionment decisions, he contends that the financing systems 
dilute the votes of residents in poorer districts in much the same 
manner as malapportionment of state legislatures diluted the fran-
chise of voters in more populous districts.175 He concludes that the 
systems violate the equal protection clause since no rational basis 
can exist for a system which creates such gross disparities in revenue-
raising capacity.176 Extending this argument to its logical conclusion, 
he suggests that the Court should nullify financing systems that create 
large disparities in revenue-raising ability among districts for all 
municipal services and not simply for education.177 This theory has 
the virtue of invalidating current financing systems without an ex-
pansive application of the strict standard of review and without the 
necessity of establishing a causal relationship between educational 
expenditures and educational achievement.178 
However, this theory is in other respects even broader than the 
Serrano approach. As noted above, the Serrano decision to apply the 
strict standard of review to California's school financing system can 
be limited to cases in which a statute creates a wealth classification 
affecting education. Schoettle's theory would involve the Court in 
equal protection scrutiny of wealth classifications with respect to all 
municipal services. 
Furthermore, there is some question whether the analogy be-
tween school financing legislation and legislative apportionment is 
appropriate. Baker and its progeny involved malapportionment of 
legislative districts that diluted some citizens' votes for state legis-
lators, who represent their constituents on the full range of political 
issues. In contrast, the educational financing cases involve disparity 
in voting power among groups of citizens on only one issue: the rate 
at which districts tax themselves on their property. Thus deviation 
from the "one man-one vote" principle in the educational financing 
172. Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1407-12. 
173. Id. at 1407-09. 
174. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
175. Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1409. 
176. Id. at 1405-06. 
177. Id. at 1412. 
178. Id. at 1411-12. 
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context does not harm disadvantaged voters as extensively as in the 
legislative apportionment setting.179 
The traditional standard of review may serve as an escape valve 
for the Supreme Court if it desires to invalidate the controversial 
educational financing systems without expanding the strict standard 
of review. 
Ill. JUSTICIABILITY, COSTS OF REFORM, AND THE PROPRIETY 
OF A JUDICIAL SOLUTION 
A. ]usticiability 
The decision in Mclnnis rested partially, if not totally, on lack of 
justiciability, since the court determined that there were no judicially 
manageable standards for resolution of the litigation.189 The plain-
tiffs asserted that educational expenditures should be apportioned 
according to the individual student's educational needs.181 The three-
judge district court concluded that it was incapable of determining 
what a student's needs were, and consequently that it could not apply 
the standard for resolution proposed by plaintiffs.182 
Plaintiffs in more recent school financing cases have offered a 
standard that is far narrower and more concrete than the educational 
needs standard advanced in Mclnnis. In Rodriguez, the case cur-
rently before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs convinced the three-
judge federal district court to accept the principle of fiscal neutrality 
as the proper judicial standard for resolution of the controversy.188 
Simply stated, "fiscal neutrality" means that "the quality of public 
education may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of 
the state [as a whole]."184 This standard does not attempt to measure 
179. For further comment on Schoettle's proposal, see Goldstein, supra note 8, at 
542-43; Karst, supra note 3, at 752-54. · 
180. 293 F. Supp. at 335-36. See Baker v. Carr, 339 U.S. 186, 217 (1962): McCloskey, 
Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REv. 54 (1962). McCloskey observes, 
"It seems fairly clear that for Justice Brennan [the author of the Baker opinion] 'tl1e 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards' is the only reason that 
might cause the Court to call a question involving state governmental arrangements a 
political question." Id. at 60 (emphasis original). See also Silard &: White, supra note 
3, at 23-24. 
181. 293 F. Supp. at 329. 
182. 293 F. Supp. at 335-36. 
183. 337 F. Supp. at 283-84. The court in Van Dusart1. e.;:pressly accepted the fiscal 
neutrality standard. 334 F. Supp. at 872. It has been suggested that the court in 
Serrano impliedly accepted that standard at 5 Cal. lld at 587, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 
Cal. Rptr. at 604. First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 120 n.3. Professor Wise in School 
Finance, supra note 3, at 124, notes that Serrano can be read as requiring more tllan 
mere fiscal neutrality. He suggests that the court's opinion may mean that the 
quality of a child's education may not be a function of "where [he] lives, what his 
parental circumstances are, or how highly his neighbors value education," 
184. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note a, at 304. See also First 
Appraisal, supra note 3, at 111. 
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such complex concepts as "educational opportunity" or "educational 
needs," but rather is concerned primarily with equality of revenue-
raising capacity. If all school districts within the state can collect 
substantially equal amounts of revenue per pupil by taxing them-
selves at the same rate, the neutrality standard is satisfied.185 The 
fiscal neutrality standard has the virtue that it allows state legislatures 
great flexibility in fashioning an alternative system so long as condi-
tions of local wealth are disregarded.186 Since the standard concen-
185. First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 114. 
186. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 307. See First Ap-
praisal, supra note 3, at 116, describing five model financing systems that satisfy fiscal 
neutrality. See also School Finance, supra note 3, at 127-30 ("A Model Legislative 
Response" to fiscal neutrality, designed for Maryland); Comment, supra note 3, at 187-98. 
One means of achieving fiscal neutrality would be for the state to assume the 
entire burden of financing public education. This alternative has been recommended 
by The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in STATE .AID TO LoCAL 
GOVERNMENT (1969), the Fleischman Commission in New York, the National Educational 
Finance Project, and Governor Milliken of Michigan in REPORT OF THE GoVERNoR's CoM-
MISSION ON EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1969). For a consideration of these proposals, see 
School Finance, supra note 3, at 125-27. See also Silard &: White, supra note 3, at 30. 
Kirp &: Yudof, supra note 3, at 145, emphasize that under the fiscal neutrality 
standard 
[the] legislature could choose to centralize or decentralize either revenue raising 
or school governance; it could employ a state-wide property tax, an industrial 
property tax, an income tax; or it could opt for • • • compensatory education 
programs •••• A legislature may choose to allocate funds on the basis of the 
characteristics of the consumers of the service, the children. 
Another alternative ••. is an allocation of funds based on the characteristics of 
each school district •••• mhe number of pupils, the number of schools, the wil-
lingness of a district to make a greater or lesser property tax effort . • . and the 
degree of racial integration within the district could be considered in allocating 
money. Extra dollars could be distributed to communities where the cost of pro-
viding educational services ••• is appreciably higher. Older industrial communi-
ties could be compensated for ••• municipal overburden •••• 
A state legislature might decide to make education funds available on the basis 
of family characteristics. If a family is poor, their poverty could be treated as 
shorthand for the greater educational requirements of the children in the fam-
ily .••• 
Thus, the funding remedies which may flow from the Serrano decision are 
compatible with any legitimate state interest in educational governance. • • • 
See PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 33-35, 200-42, for a 
detailed analysis of "power equalizing," a system that allegedly satisfies the fiscal 
neutrality standard and still retains local control. "District power equalizing" allows 
the state to maintain local districts and even continue to raise school revenue through 
local property taxes. The state would set a maximum limit on the amount of revenue 
that a district could spend if it chose to tax itself at a given rate. If the district is unable 
to raise the specified amount by taxing at the prescribed rate, the state would furnish 
the difference; and if a district could raise more than the specified amount at a pre-
scribed level, the state would collect and redistribute the excess. Since each district 
would be free to choose the level at which it would tax itself, the amount of revenue 
raised within the district would depend upon the district's willingness to tax itself 
rather than upon its wealth in terms of taxable property. 
District power equalizing may not go far enough in equalizing educational ex-
penditures since disparities due to differences in district tax effort may be no more 
defensible than those due to the district wealth. PRIVATE "WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, 
supra note 3, at 256-68; Michelman, supra note 3, at 53-56; Kirp & Yudof, Book Review, 
supra note 3, at 625. Therefore, it is contended that a "family power equalizing" 
scheme would be more appropriate. Michelman, supra note 3, at 53. Under this plan, 
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trates on concrete figures rather than elusive concepts, it appears to 
be judicially manageable.187 
Assuming that the standard of fiscal neutrality is judicially man-
ageable, it may be irrelevant to the goal of achieving educational 
equality. Critics have suggested that concentration on equality of 
expenditures or equality of revenue-raising capacity cannot eliminate 
inequities in existing systems.188 Thus, some still maintain that the 
Court must apply an affirmative, subjective standard such as "equal 
learning opportunity," "equal educational achievement," or "equal 
educational resources" if the Court's decision is to have any meaning-
ful effect on education.189 It should be apparent, however, that what-
ever gains in relevancy might result from the more subjective stan-
dards must be balanced against the loss in judicial manageability of 
the objective standard of fiscal neutrality. Given the competing 
values inherent in an educational system and the inconclusiveness 
of available data, it is difficult to see how the Court could intelli-
gently select one of the subjective standards as opposed to another 
and then proceed to sanctify it with constitutional protection.100 A 
sacrifice of some degree of "relevancy" to actual educational prob-
lems seems inevitable if the Court intends to intervene at all. The 
Court would be well advised to stick to the standard of fiscal neutral-
ity, as it promises to be the most manageable of the alternatives. 
the significant unit would be the family rather than the school district, The family 
would choose the rate at which it would tax itself on its income per child. As with 
district power equalizing, the family would be ensured of receiving a specified amount 
at a given tax rate. The state would provide schools that offered varying degrees of 
educational resources. The more that was offered, the higher would be the tuition. 
The student would attend a school whose offering was commensurate with the tax 
effort made by his family. It would be up to the child's family to decide what quality 
level of education the child should receive. Such a plan could be administered through 
education vouchers. See generally Coons &: Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: d 
Model State System for Vouchers, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 321 (1971). The educational 
voucher systems and the legal problems involved are discussed in Areen, Education 
Vouchers, 6 HARv. CIV. R.IGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REv. 466 (1971). 
Even those who support family power equalizing concede that it is a radical notion 
unlikely to gain political acceptance in the near future. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC 
EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 268. Furthermore, as noted by Professors Kirp and Yudof, 
Book Review, supra note 3, at 625-26, it may be no more reasonable to allow expcndi• 
tures on a child's education to depend upon the willingness of his family to tax itself 
than it is to rely on the taxing attitude of his school district. Perhaps a plan that 
focused only upon the needs of the individual child would be more equitable. How• 
ever, that is exactly the type of proposal rejected in Mcinnis as unmanageable. 
187. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 13. 
188. See Silard &: White, supra note 3, at 26, 29. 
189. For an exploration of the different possible standards of measuring educational 
equality, see A. WISE, supra note 3, at 143-59. See also PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC 
EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 304-11. 
190. See PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 13, See also 
Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1396. 
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Recent data, most significantly the Coleman Report,191 also raise 
the issue of whether disparities in educational expenditures bear any 
relation to disparities in educational opportunity.192 The Coleman 
Report is the result of a massive government study of racial segrega-
tion as well as the factors influencing educational opportunity and 
achievement. The results of the study are quite controversial and 
not easily summarized. Nevertheless, the study suggests that varia-
tions in the size of school facilities and faculties have very little effect 
on educational achievement of students.193 Since the great bulk of 
educational revenues are used to pay teachers and provide school 
facilities, the data may suggest that inequalities in educational ex-
penditures have little effect on the goal of ensuring quality education 
to all.194 If it invalidates current educational financing systems, the 
Court might promote fiscal equity and yet do little to advance edu-
cational opportunity.195 
Nevertheless, the Coleman Report by no means conclusively 
establishes that disparities in educational expenditures have no effect 
on educational opportunity.196 Educators, legislators, and voters 
apparently assume that higher expenditures will result in better 
education since they continually increase educational spending. It 
is arguable that poor districts ought to be able to proceed under the 
191. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966) [hereinafter COLEMAN REPORT]. 
192. See Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1378-88. But see Silard & White, supra note 3, 
at 10. 
193. The study concluded that 
schools bring little influence to bear on a child's achievement that is independent 
of his background and general social context; and that this very lack of an inde-
pendent effect means that the inequalities imposed on children by their home, 
neighborhood and peer environment are carried along to become the inequalities 
with which they confront adult life at the end of school. 
O>LEMAN REPORT, supra note 191, at 325. 
194. It is estimated by The National Center for Educational Statistics, Office of 
Education, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Statistics of Local and 
Public School Systems, 1967, at 15 (1969), dtecl by Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1359, that 
local school districts spend as much as two thirds of their annual budgets to pay 
teachers. Of course, a minimum amount of expenditures per pupil may be necessary 
to provide a decent education even if a substantial increase in spending above that 
amount will not significantly improve the quality of education. Dimond, supra note 3, 
at 141 n.48. But this minimum amount may be provided in most states since a 
minimum level of expenditures per pupil is generally guaranteed by the state. 
195. School Finance, supra note 3, at 124, 130; Kirp & Yudof, Book Review, supra 
note 3, at 625. 
196. See J. GUTHRIE, G. KLEINDORFER, H. LEvIN, R. STOUT, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY 
57-84 (1971) for the argument that there is a positive correlation between educational 
services (hence educational expenditures) and educational achievement. See ON EQUALITY 
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1972) for a recent and largely favorable reassessment of 
the COLEMAN REPORT. For other recent studies assessing the methods and conclusions 
of the COLEMAN REPORT, see Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1387. 
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same assumption, however dubious, as wealthier districts107 and 
spend the same amount as those districts with no greater tax effort. 
"Fiscal neutrality" is a judicially manageable standard by which 
the Court could redress inequities in educational finance, but given 
the complex nature of the problem, a decision to overturn the pres-
ent methods of educational finance may not have a significant effect 
upon the quality of education. The Court must decide whether the 
benefits of such a decision in terms of fiscal equity and the possibility 
of increased educational achievement outweigh the costs of over-
turning most of the nation's educational financing systems. 
B. Costs of Reform 
Another consideration arises from the magnitude of the school 
financing litigation. Most states depend on local property ta.xes to 
finance public education. If the Supreme Court should decide that 
one of the state systems of financing education violates equal protec-
tion, most of the states would be forced to abandon their current 
systems and adopt acceptable alternatives. The consequences of such 
a decision would be of enormous magnitude. Nevertheless, the in-
tegration and reapportionment decisions illustrate that the Court 
is willing to attack a problem of immense proportion when it is con-
vinced that critical issues are at stake and that judicial action is 
necessary. 
Before it becomes involved in a problem of the dimensions of 
school financing, the Court thoroughly considers the legislative as 
well as the judicial costs. The costs that the Court would impose 
upon state legislatures by invalidating current educational financing 
schemes fall into two categories. First, legislatures would have to 
expend considerable time and effort in developing a constitutionally 
acceptable scheme for financing public education. Second, it may 
cost the states far more to operate financing systems that equalize 
districts' spending than to operate the current systems. 
As in desegregation and reapportionment cases, the burden of 
producing new financing systems would be on the state legislatures 
if the Court chose to overturn the current systems.198 Given the cur-
rent popular dissatisfaction with property taxes and with present 
educational financing systems, most state legislatures may find it nec-
essary to initiate educational financing reforms in the near future 
with or without an order from the Court. Since alternative school 
:financing schemes have already been proposed, the legislatures would 
197. See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 872 (D. Minn. 1971): PRIVATE 
WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 30. See note 35 supra. 
198. In Rodriguez, the court ordered the legislature to restructure the financing 
system within two years to conform with the concept of fiscal neutrality. 337 F. Supp. 
at 286. 
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not have to start from scratch. The cost of devising a new pro-
gram is not likely to be prohibitive. 
On the other hand, the potential costs of operating a new system 
carry greater weight. It appears that a system of educational finance 
that equalizes expenditures by districts must inevitably be a more 
expensive system.199 Equality could be achieved either by "leveling" 
the highest-spending districts down or by "leveling" the lowest-
spending districts up.200 Those districts capable of supporting a high 
level of spending will be adamantly opposed to a "leveling down." 
Consequently, "leveling up" may be the only politically feasible 
course of action,201 but it would probably require a higher aggregate 
level of spending on education than the current system.202 Whatever 
system a state adopts to equalize district spending, it is virtually in-
evitable that the state itself will have to furnish substantially more 
money for education from the state treasury. In view of the current 
budgetary difficulties that many states are experiencing as well as 
the developing taxpayers' revolt, the necessity for increased state aid 
to education could create severe problems for state legislatures. 
In addition to legislative costs, the Court must also consider the 
judicial costs of invalidating state educational financing systems in 
terms of the judicial effort that would be required to supervise a 
reform plan. Given the already crowded federal dockets, as well as 
the Court'~ enduring commitment to school integration, the Court 
must decide whether the benefits that may result from judicial reform 
justify the commitment of judicial resources that may be necessary. 
Certainly, it is unlikely that the Court could dispose of the issue 
with one decision. The variety of existing financing systems and ac-
ceptable alternatives would undoubtedly result in the Supreme 
Court's hearing an entire line of cases. As with the desegregation and 
reapportionment cases, the federal district courts would have to 
maintain continuing jurisdiction to police and eventually ratify 
state legislative reforms.208 
In a large measure, the extent of the judicial commitment would 
probably depend upon the degree of public resistance to the Court's 
199. But see First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 121 n.45. 
200. See Kurland, supra note 3, at 590-91. See also Kirp &: Yudof, supra note 3, at 
624-26. 
201. But see Kurland, supra note 3, at 590. 
202. Silard &: White, supra note 3, at 31-32. A special New York Commission that 
recently completed a study of educational financing in that state suggested that the 
state "level up" the poorer districts over a five-year period. It estimated that such a 
process would cost the state an additional 715 million dollars per year. N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 29, 1972, at I, col. 8. Likewise, the proposed model reform of Maryland's school 
financing system, School Finance, supra note 3, at 128-29, recommends that the state 
raise all districts to the level of expenditures by the highest-spending district. It is 
estimated that this would cost an additional 200 million dollars per year. 
203. See PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 447-48. 
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decision.204 If the public accepts the Court's judgment, the Court 
could probably implement its decree with a reasonable expenditure 
of time and effort. If public resistance is significant, however, the 
Court might find itself involved in an enduring struggle to imple-
ment its orders. The integration cases well illustrate this point.2M 
It is possible that the politically powerful suburban districts would 
respond negatively to a Supreme Court decision overturning state 
educational financing schemes out of fear that their well-financed 
schools would be sacrificed on the altar of general equality.200 Subur-
banites could protect the quality of their schools by insisting that 
the legislature "level up" poorer schools to equality with those in 
wealthy districts, although this alternative would certainly involve 
an increase in taxes. On the whole, however, there is little reason to 
expect that invalidation of school financing schemes would provoke 
substantial opposition. Lower court decisions that have invalidated 
financing systems have been well received by the press and the pub-
lic, 201 perhaps partially because of a growing dissatisfaction ·with the 
property tax.208 The restructuring of educational financing systems 
would not be the emotional issue that school integration is.200 Pre-
liminary responses suggest that the reform of educational financing 
systems would not result in a division of opinion along ideological 
Iines.210 
In the event that political opposition does arise, however, the 
Court would have various remedies available. Commentators have 
suggested that the Court could excuse students from attendance, 
order admission in other districts, award monetary compensation, 
impound and redistribute flat funds, sequester the funds of rich 
districts, use its contempt power, raise taxes, hire experts to plan a 
new system, or shut down the school system entirely.211 It is not clear, 
however, that the Court would welcome the resort to such harsh 
204. See Kurland, supra note 3, at 592-93. 
205. Id. at 595. 
206. See id. at 591, 598-99. 
207. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 8, at I, col. 6; Homogeneous Education, Wall St, 
J., Dec. 30, 1971, at 6, col. I; A. Welcome Blow at the School Tax, FORTUNE, Oct. 1971, 
at 68; A. Bad Way To Pay for Schools, LIFE, Dec. IO, 1971, at 42; Paying for Good 
Schools, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. II, 1971, at 5-6. 
208. See King, Taxes Bite Deeper, No Relief Foreseen, N.Y. Times, Jan. lll, 1972, 
at I, col. 6; The Taxing Question, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31, 1972, at 48 [hereinafter The 
Taxing QuestionJ. 
209. See PRlvATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 454. 
210. See First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 118. In Michigan both the Democrats and 
the Republicans have submitted plans for reforming the current educational financing 
methods. Tschirhart, Does School Tax Violate Equal Rights1, Detroit News, Feb. 6, 1972, 
§ B, at IO, col. 1 [hereinafter TschirhartJ. 
211. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 8, at 448; Silard 8: White, 
supra note 3, at 31. 
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alternatives. If the Court anticipated outright resistance to its decrees, 
it might prefer to avoid involvement in educational financing litiga-
tion altogether. 
C. Propriety of a Judicial Solution 
Assuming that educational financing systems are in need of re-
form, the question of who should initiate the reforms arises. In 
Rodriguez, the Supreme Court must first consider whether it pos-
sesses the necessary expertise to resolve the far-reaching policy ques-
tions that are inherent in the issue of educational financing reform. 
The educational financing litigation involves complex issues of both 
educational and economic policy. As noted above, it is hardly a fore-
gone conclusion that equalization of educational spending by school 
districts would improve the quality of public education. What is 
more disturbing, however, is the possibility that reform might 
actually have a negative effect on the quality of public education.212 
If taxpayers resist the tax increases, equalization might result in 
leveling down the wealthier districts to a median level, which would 
dilute the quality of the best schools without necessarily improving 
the worst significantly.218 Another possibility is that suburbanites 
might desert the public schools in favor of private schools if they 
were convinced that their property tax dollars would be used to 
improve poorer schools throughout the state rather than their own 
public schools.214 Consequently, a substantial body of voters might 
coalesce in an effort to defeat all tax increases aimed at improving 
the quality of public education.215 In addition to these "political" 
problems, questions would arise concerning the long-range effect of 
abandoning the current financing system on the functioning of local 
government, suburban growth, relocation of industry, centralization 
of government, increases in the use of sales and income taxes, and 
exclusionary zoning.216 
In terms of expertise, the Court is not the best-qualified institu-
tion to analyze these complex issues. The judiciary is quite often a 
212. See First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 114. 
213. Kurland, supra note 3, at 590-91. 
214. But see PRlvATE WEALTH AND Ptmuc EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 275. 
215. Kurland, supra note 3, at 59. But see PRIVATE WEALTH AND Ptmuc EDUCATION, 
supra note 3, at 278. 
216. Andrews, supra note 117. For the argument that any adjustment of educational 
financing methods would necessarily have a significant effect upon the state tax 
structure as a whole, as well as the financing of all other municipal services, see 
Dimond, supra note 3, at 136. See also PRlvATE WEALTH AND Ptmuc EDUCATION, supra 
note 3, at 280-83. See generally Schoettle, supra note 3, at 388-93 (the Court is not quali-
fied to grant specific remedies in areas where the public budget is involved since it is not 
competent to make the necessary value judgments concerning what goals the state 
should pursue and what mixture of spending will best promote the achievement of 
these goals). 
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forum for effective advocacy rather than careful analysis. The Court 
does not have the fact-finding resources of the legislature, nor does it 
have the experience in considering questions of educational and 
economic policy that the legislature has. Finally, the Court does not 
have the time that the legislature has to devote to extended analysis 
of the issues.217 Resolution of the educational financing issue will 
inevitably involve value judgments of great significance with respect 
to social, educational, and economic policy. These judgments should 
be made by a branch of government that is directly representative of 
the people.218 
Of course, .the details of new school financing plans would be 
worked out by the legislatures. Nevertheless, by initiating the re-
forms and setting the basic ground rules, the Court would set in 
motion a process whose impact on the future of public education and 
society as a whole would be immense and uncertain. The Court 
could hardly disavow the consequences of "reforms" that it has ini-
tiated. Yet should the reforms tum sour, the Court could not be held 
politically accountable. Furthermore, if the Court's ideas of equality 
of educational financing should prove unworkable or counterpro-
ductive, the constitutional basis of the reforms would make a change 
of direction difficult. Thus, the educational financing litigation may 
be the type of case in which the Court should exercise judicial re-
straint. 
The Court has, however, occasionally undertaken to resolve 
problems involving major policy issues that might more appropriately 
have been dealt with by another branch of government. The inte-
gration and reapportionment decisions are the two most striking 
examples. The Court's decisions to intervene in these areas were 
motivated by necessity. In both instances, legislatures arguably 
should have initiated reform, but it was clear that legislative reform 
was politically hazardous and thus unlikely. Given the political com-
position of many of the state legislatures and the United States Con-
gress, it was quite apparent that desegregation could not be initiated 
through the normal political channels.219 In addition, the Court's 
intervention may have been necessitated by the fact that Plessey v. 
Ferguson220 was still available as authority for segregationist legisla-
tion. Likewise, malapportioned legislatures were unwilling to re-
217. Kurland, supra note 3, at 600; Schoettle, supra note 8, at 1396. The district 
court in Burrus v. Wilkerson acknowledged the difficulty that the financing cases 
presented when it commented that "the courts have neither the knowledge, nor the 
means, nor the power to tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs of these 
students throughout the state." 810 F. Supp. at 574. 
218. See Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1398-99. 
219. Cox, supra note 111, at 122. 
220. 168 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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apportion themselves in the absence of external pressure since it was 
to the political advantage of the parties that controlled the legisla-
tures to resist reapportionment.221 Once the Court concluded that 
reforms were of extraordinary importance, that the issues were judi-
cially cognizable, and that there was no hope of resolution through 
normal political channels, its intervention became imperative. 
The Court will probably evaluate the possibilities of educational 
financing reform by normal political processes. The inequalities 
created by educational financing systems have existed for quite some 
time without major legislative reform. This legislative inertia might 
suggest that there is little hope for change through ordinary political 
channels.222 However, it has only been ·within the past decade that 
some of the most serious inequities of the financing systems have been 
recognized,228 and much of the influential ·writing on the subject has 
been done quite recently.224 Only within the past year have the ine-
qualities of educational financing become an issue of general public 
concern, and there is always lag time between initial expressions of 
public solicitude and legislative response. 
Currently, the time for substantial legislative reform of educa-
tional financing systems is ripe. Popular support for court decisions 
overturning state financing systems has been encouraging to reform-
ers. The response from the media has been almost entirely favorable, 
and no significant opposition groups have coalesced. Furthermore, 
dissatisfaction with the local property tax at the same time that edu-
cational financing reform is in its incipiency might well be one of 
those accidents of history that gives rise to significant change in the 
status quo. Since half of the school districts are by definition below 
the state median of taxable wealth and since the vast majority of 
districts have far less taxable property than the richest districts, it 
would seem that a substantial percentage of the state's citizens would 
benefit from a more equitable system of educational financing.2211 
Given the current concern for education, when full information 
221. Cox, supra note 111, at 122. Undoubtedly other factors prompted judicial 
intervention in these cases. In the desegregation litigation, it was significant that the 
primary purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to ensure equality to the Negro. 
In the reapportionment cases the fact that reforms promised to improve the operation• 
of representative government probably affected the Court's decision to intervene. 
222. l'RlvATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 292-93. 
223. Id. at 46, 65. 
224. E.g., C. B!!NSON, THE CHEE:RFUL PROSPEcr: A STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF 
PUBUC EDUCATION (1965); A. WISE, supra note 3; PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, 
supra note 3; J. THOMAS, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MICHIGAN 
(1968). · 1·1 : "fl~ 1$1~ 
225. First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 118. It has also been suggested that owners 
of commercial and industrial property in the poorer districts might support legislative 
reform since it might result in a lowering of their tax rates. Id. 
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about the substantial disparities among districts in educational re-
sources gains currency, the public probably will support reform.226 
Significant reform efforts have already been initiated at both the 
state and national levels. In New York, a commission appointed by 
the governor recently culminated a two-year study by issuing an ex-
tensive report on the need for reforming the State's educational 
financing system.227 The commission urged that the State assume the 
task of raising and distributing funds for public education through 
a uniform state-wide property tax.228 The report proposed that the 
expenditures of wealthier districts be frozen at current levels and 
that poorer districts be raised to parity with these levels over a five-
year period.229 The commission report received immediate support 
from state legislative leaders, although the complexity and the long-
range implications of the problem may delay reform for up to five 
years until the legislature has studied the issue and possible alterna-
tive solutions.230 If the efforts of New York are emulated throughout 
the nation, substantial judicial action may prove unnecessary. 
Michigan is another state in which the legislative process is re-
acting to public concern over the inequities in educational financing. 
While suits challenging the Michigan system of educational financing 
are pending,231 both the Republicans and the Democrats have pro-
posed plans for restructuring the system and are conducting petition 
campaigns to include their respective plans on the November ballot 
as proposed constitutional amendments.282 The Republican proposal 
would abolish the property tax as a method of school financing and 
replace it 1\Tith an increase in the personal income tax and a value-
added sales tax.233 The revenue collected would be distributed to 
local districts in order to retain some form of local control. The 
Democratic proposal would replace the local property tax with a 
graduated income tax.284 Regardless of whether the Michigan su-
preme court declares the current financing system unconstitutional, 
the State is well along the road toward significant reform. 
In addition, federal legislative reform is currently being consid-
226. A recent poll (California Poll 3281, 1967, cited by Kirp &: Yudof, supra note 8, 
at 147 n.8) determined that 83% of the citizens of California "felt that poor districts 
should receive as much money per pupil as rich districts." 
227. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 8. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at I, cot 8; at 84, col. 1. 
230. Id. at 34, cols. 3-4. 
231. Milliken v. Green, Civil No. 1!!664-C (Cir. Ct. Ingham County, Mich., filed 
Oct. 16, 1971); Montgomery v. Milliken, Civil No. 13719-C (Cir. Ct. Ingham County, 
Mich., filed Oct. 27, 1971). 
232. Tschirhart, supra note 210, at 10, col. 1. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 10, col. 3. 
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ered. A special commission recently completed a two-year study of 
educational financing and presented the President with its report.235 
The commission recommended that the state governments assume 
the major burden of financing public education.236 It proposed that 
the federal government offer the states between 4.5 and 7 .5 billion 
dollars over the next five years as an incentive to reform.237 These 
proposals are currently being studied by the executive branch, and, 
notably, President Nixon referred to the problem of educational 
financing in his state of the Union message. Thus, in the future the 
federal government may play a larger role in supporting public edu-
cation.238 In addition, the President has recently signed a bill which 
·will provide substantial aid to education.289 In particular, the Act 
~rill provide 2 billion dollars in federal funds to grade schools and 
high schools in districts that are currently involved in desegrega-
tion. 240 While this will not alleviate the massive inequalities caused 
by current educational financing methods, it suggests that in the 
future the federal government may be willing to assume a substan-
tial share of the cost of ensuring equal educational opportunity. It 
has also been announced that the President intends to propose 
legislation that would call for a nationwide value-added sales tax,241 
the proceeds of which would be recycled to the states to help support 
public education.242 In exchange for federal funds, the states would 
agree to repeal some of their current property taxes or extend income 
tax credits to families that pay such taxes.243 Senator McGovern has 
also submitted a proposal that the federal government pay one third 
of the current costs of educational financing.244 Clearly, there is a 
·significant chance for major legislative reforms at the national as 
well as the state level in the not too distant future.245 Thus, there 
appears to be no immediate necessity for judicial action on the edu-
cational financing problem. Given the complexity of the problem, un-
certainty about the efficacy of proposed solutions, and the potentiality 
of legislative reform, the Supreme Court should probably refrain 
from intervening in the educational financing controversy at this 
time. 
235. N.Y. Times, March 7, 1972, at 1, col. 8. 
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239. Pub. L 92-318, 92d Cong., S. 659, June 2!1, 1972, reprinted in 41 U.S.L.W. 1 
(Stat. July 18, 1972). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court may have been attempting to exercise ju-
dicial restraint when it summarily affirmed the judgments in Mclnnis 
and Burrus. Conceivably, these cases are best interpreted as delaying 
actions designed to channel the issues of educational financing out 
of the courts and into the legislatures.246 The reformers continued 
to litigate, however, and three years after Mclnnis the constitutional 
challenge to educational financing systems has returned to the Su-
preme Court. 
The Court is now under pressure to decide the educational financ-
ing case on the merits. Since the reform movement has been pursued 
in the judicial context, the media and the public are focusing on the 
Court for a definitive resolution of the question.247 The status of 
Mclnnis and Burrus as controlling precedents has been drawn into 
question and can only be clarified by the Supreme Court. The Court 
may feel constrained to supply guidance to courts that are hearing 
school financing cases, especially since some courts that have already 
decided such cases have apparently ignored the implications of recent 
Supreme Court opinions by applying the strict equal protection 
standard to school financing legislation. Finally, the basic posture 
of the present litigation almost demands a decision on the merits. 
After Mclnnis the Supreme Court could avoid directly confronting 
the issue of the constitutionality of school financing systems by simply 
summarily affirming judgments, especially since Mclnnis rested par-
tially on nonjusticiability. Now, however, if the Supreme Court 
summarily affirms the judgment of Rodriguez v. San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District, the educational financing case currently on 
the Court's docket, it will implicitly approve the Serrano doctrine, 
on which Rodriguez relied. If the Court disapproves of Serrano, it 
will be forced to confront the school financing issue on the merits. 
These factors push the Court toward a full review of Rodriguez. 
There are a number of different ways that the Court could deal 
with Rodriguez. It could affirm the decision and adopt the strict 
-standard of review rationale that has prevailed in the lower courts. 
Such a decision would be one of the most potentially expansive equal 
protection decisions of the past decade, and the Court appears to be 
concerned with restricting the application of the strict standard of 
review to its current perimeters. Therefore, it seems unlikely that 
the Court will follow Serrano and abandon the restrictive approach 
that it established in Dandridge, Valtierra, and Lindsey. 
The Court may choose to review the Texas school financing 
scheme under the rational basis test. How strictly the Court will 
246. Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1378. 
247. See Andrews, supra note 117; Stevens, supra note 8. 
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apply the rational basis test is uncertain, and thus the validity of the 
financing system in Rodriguez is a close question under this standard. 
If the Court is convinced that there is no rational basis for the current 
financing systems, that there are manageable and relevant judicial 
standards, that the Court has sufficient expertise to adequately resolve 
the issues, and that there is no reason to defer to the legislature, the 
Court may hold that the Texas school financing system violates the 
equal protection clause under the traditional standard of review. 
If the Court does not feel disposed to affirm Rodriguez, it need 
not reverse immediately. It is generally agreed that existing educa-
tional financing systems are in need of reform. Even if the Court 
does not wish to initiate reforms itself, it may be reluctant to reach a 
decision that would discourage reform efforts of other branches of 
government. The media and the public would read a reversal of 
Rodriguez by the Supreme Court as a legitimization of the current 
inequitable financing systems,248 although the Court's decision would 
stand only for the conclusion that current systems simply do not 
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution or that re-
forms can more adequately be enacted by legislative bodies. Thus, 
reversal of Rodriguez would doubtlessly have an adverse effect on the 
progress of school financing reform in the legislatures. 
Professor Kalven recently commented in regard to the current 
constitutional challenges of the death penalty that "[t]his may be an 
instance in which the very existence of constitutional litigation will 
prove more significant than its outcome, underscoring the importance 
for the dynamics of American political life of the forum provided by 
the Court."249 To a lesser degree the same result might conceivably 
occur in the area of educational financing as well: the public may 
demand reform despite a Supreme Court reversal of Rodriguez. In 
such a case, the courts would have served as a public forum by 
focusing attention on an important social problem and thereby 
forcing the legislature to perform its function. 
Given the uncertain effects of an adverse decision on the cause 
of reform, however, the Court may not wish to reverse Rodriguez. 
The Court may indeed have on its docket a case of extreme national 
importance that it is unwilling to affirm or reverse. In such an event, 
the Court could postpone a decision, for as long as two or three years, 
by scheduling and rescheduling the case for hearing until it feels a 
decision is appropriate.250 This would allow Congress as well as 
248. Cf. Cox, supra note 111, at 97-98. 
249. Xalven, Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War, 85 HARv. L. R.Ev. 3, 21 
(1971). 
250. For instance, Brown v. Board of Education initially reached the Cc;mrt's 
docket and was argued in October Term, 1952. It was reargued twice and the 
decisions were finally handed down in 1954 and 1955. 
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state legislatures time to develop measures for reforming educational 
financing. Delay would not provide much immediate guidance for 
the courts around the nation that are currently entertaining litiga-
tion challenging educational financing systems. However, the Court 
might be willing to sacrifice this consideration temporarily in the 
hope that the financing issue would be equitably resolved by means 
other than judicial intervention. 
The difficulty with postponement is that legislatures may defer 
reform until the Court acts while the Court is waiting for legis-
latures to go fonvard. In the event of such a stalemate, the Court 
should take the initiative and invalidate the Texas financing system 
on equal protection grounds. But at this point in time, it is simply 
too early to determine whether judicial action is necessary.201 
The reform of educational financing systems is an idea whose 
time has arrived. Within the next decade meaningful reform is 
inevitable. The constitutionality of current financing systems is now 
before the Supreme Court in Rodriguez. The Serrano rationale may 
not provide the vehicle for equalizing educational .financing through-
out the nation considering the Court's recent trend toward restraint 
under the equal protection clause. Nor is it clear that immediate 
judicial action would be in the best interests of reform given the 
complexity of the problem and the potential for significant legis-
lative and executive initiatives. Nevertheless, the judicial branch 
has played and will doubtlessly continue to play an important role 
in educational financing reform. Ultimately, this reform movement 
may be a model of constructive interaction between the various 
branches and levels of government in an effort to provide equal 
protection of the laws. 
251. Kurland, supra note 3, at 600. 
